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PROTECTION FROM PROTECTION: SECTION 1983 AND THE
ADA'S IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVISING A RACE-CONSCIOUS
POLICE MISCONDUCT STATUTE
THORNE CLARKt
"In the dome the prisoner waited ... shackled to inertia by a great chain
of years." 1
-Henry Dumas, black-American author slain by
a police officer in a case of "mistaken identity"
INTRODUCTION
Henry Dumas was no prophet; he merely illustrated what was and
is readily apparent to those inclined or forced to consider the extent
and the impact of racism in daily life. Before he was shot to death in a
subway by a mistaken New York City police officer in 1968,2 Dumas
wrote stories that explored themes central to the experiences of many
black persons in the United States-including the prevalence of mis-
conduct by law enforcement officers.i His characters' words are apro-
t B.A. 1998, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsylvania.
Many people deserve thanks for making this Comment complete, with the understand-
ing that any errors lingering herein are my own and that the views presented do not
necessarily reflect those of anyone other than the author. I would like to thank the
members of the National Police Accountability Project of the National Lawyers Guild
for their critical input and advice. I would also like to extend a special thanks to Aaron
Frishberg, Esq., for offering his advice and his time despite a busy schedule of serving
justice, and to my parents and Professor Regina Austin for their invaluable insights and
suggestions. The Associate Editors' hard work and attention to detail were essential.
Finally, thanks to Ian, Ben, and Darin for their fraternal support and motivation, and
to Valmik, Corben, Keeley, and all others whose experiences offer a vivid testament to
the fact that lines are still drawn.
I HENRY DuMAS, The Marchers, in GOODBYE, SWEETWATER: NEW AND SELECTED
STORIES 177, 177 (Eugene B. Redmond ed., 1988) [hereinafter SWEETWATER].
2 See Eugene B. Redmond, Introduction to SWEETWATER, supra note 1, at xi, xi (de-
scribing Dumas's "violent death ... deep in the Harlem subway.., shot by a white po-
liceman, under what still remain unclarified circumstances").
3 "Many of you want to know what to tell your children when they ask you why you
let the policeman hit you .... I am the most law-abiding citizen. But I'm talking about
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pos in a future he did not live to see, narrating scenarios that are still
descriptive of the present American social landscape. Describing a
young black man's encounter with four white men led by a local law
enforcement officer, he wrote: "To have looked at them would have been
too much. Four centuries of black eyes burning into four weak white men...
would've set the whole earth on fire."4 Nonetheless, Dumas was not a
prophet, because many people of color do not need divination to
make them privy to the dangers of living in the United States as a
nonwhite person. Many people of color, as a matter of course, can
and do reasonably expect interactions with the police to be unsafe.
Dumas was therefore simply a writer with a sound understanding of
American perceptions of race and the situations that are likely to oc-
cur in their wake. Forty years later, Dumas's four weak white men are
no longer necessarily going to be weak, nor white, nor men, but they
often are. And errant police officers still enjoy many of the legal pro-
tections afforded them before the Civil Rights movement.
Critical Race Theorists and their sympathizers have established a
large body of literature suggesting that the legal advances of the Civil
Rights movement, while important, do not adequately protect the
rights of people of color in practice, largely because they are diluted
by a colorblind approach 5 to legal conflicts that is often unjust when
conditions that require careful examination .... [A] close look, a breaking of things
down into component parts .... " HENRY DuMAS, Harlem, in SWEETWATER, supra note
1, at 185, 190.
4 HENRY DUMAS, Fon, in SWEETWATER, supra note 1, at 99, 111 (alteration in origi-
nal).
5 The term "colorblind approach" refers to the notion that race should not be
considered formally in legal conflicts, and that justice can prevail without addressing
racial categories explicitly. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
use of colorblind constitutionalism). The metaphor "colorblind" derives from Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which he stated:
[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our con-
stitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
Id. at 559. Harlan's introduction of the metaphor illustrates that colorblindness is not
synonymous with a benign concern for people of color, stating in the same paragraph
that
[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heri-
tage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
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applied.6 They argue that race consciousness is a valid and integral
element of human interaction, and that vilifying race consciousness in
the law is an artifact of a system of justice that devalues the impor-
tance of race, and often dismisses the presence of racism in the, first
7place. Police misconduct has emerged as one manifestation of perva-
sive racism in the United States." Nonetheless, it is still viewed as a
6 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (1999) ("To suggest that a 'color-blind' set of rules is suffi-
cient is to ignore the lion's share of inequality that pervades the criminal justice system
today. The disparities I discuss are built into the very structure and doctrine of our
criminal justice system."); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter KEYWRINGS] (of-
7ering a selection of prominent Critical Race Theory writings).
See, e.g., Introduction to KEY WRITINGS, supra note 6, at xiii, xv ("Racial justice was
embraced in the American mainstream ... by treating the exercise of racial power as
rare and aberrational rather than as systemic and ingrained.").
8 People of color are disproportionately targeted by police misconduct. See, e.g.,
JOHN L. BURRIS, BLUE vs. BLACK: LET'S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND
MINORITIES 1-2 (1999) (sharing his experience as a civil rights attorney handling po-
lice misconduct cases with "blacks, Hispanics, Asians, even whites," adding that "[n]o
single race can lay sole claim to the experience of humiliation. But mostly I've seen it
with blacks"); COLE, supra note 6, at 22 ("A survey of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment found that one-quarter of the 650 officers responding agreed that 'racial bias
(prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority citizens currently exists and... an
officer's prejudice toward the suspect's race may lead to the use of excessive force."');
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 39-43 (1998) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH] (noting that "minorities have alleged human rights violations by police more
frequently than white residents and far out of proportion to their representation in
those cities," and that the 1991 Christopher Commission "show[s] that race still plays a
central role in the use of excessive force"); PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW
TEAM REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 4 (1999) [hereinafter
INTERIM REPORT] (citing the Attorney General of NewJersey as admitting that "minor-
ity motorists have been treated differently than non-minority motorists... on the New
Jersey Turnpike" and that the "problem of disparate treatment is real"); see also
Marjorie Cohn, The Disparate Impact of the Drug War on Minorities, 55 GUILD PRAC. 199,
199 (1998) (arguing that the "War on Drugs has become a war on minorities," evinced
by, among other things, police harassment of individuals for "driving while black" and
the fact that while "[b]lacks constitute only 11 percent of drug users in this country...
[they] comprise nearly 37 percent of people arrested for drug violations"); Evan Stark,
The Myth of Black Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1990, at A21 ("When white and black
teen-agers commit the same offense, police are seven times more likely to charge black
teen-agers with a felony, and courts are more likely to imprison the teen-ager."). See
generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:5 (3d
ed. 1996) (describing statistical studies of highway stops revealing that, although whites
and African Americans violate traffic laws at almost equal rates, cars with African-
American passengers or drivers were pulled over far more often than whites, even ac-
counting for the relative number of white and African-American drivers on the road).
The authors also describe analyses indicating that there are "statistically significant dis-
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rare, if unfortunate, occurrence by whites" Even if incidents of mis-
parities in the stop rates of blacks and Hispanics versus those of whites, even after dif-
ferential crime rates among different racial and ethnic groups and among precincts
had been factored out through regression analyses." AVERY ET AL., supra, § 2:5. This
disproportionate targeting is often explicitly racist in nature. David Cole provides a
powerful example, noting that "the Louisiana State Police Department's training film
explicitly exhorts officers to use traffic stops to conduct narcotics searches of 'males of
foreign nationalities, mainly Cubans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, or other swarthy out-
landers."' COLE, supra note 6, at 41 (footnote omitted); see also STOLEN LIVES: KILLED
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT (October 22 Coalition to Stop Brutality et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter STOLEN LIVES] (cataloguing recent deaths that occurred as a result of ra-
cially discriminatory police misconduct). Including relations with police as one vector
of potential racism, one study found that "almost 60% of African Americans perceive
that they have been discriminated against in the past 3 years." Clifford L. Broman et
al., The Experience and Consequences of Perceived Racial Discrimination: A Study of African
Americans, 26J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 165, 175 (2000). Other studies reveal much higher
figures with respect to racism generally. One such study reported that 96% of the
study participants reported experiencing racist discrimination in the past year.
Elizabeth A. Klonoff & Hope Landrine, Cross-Validation of the Schedule of Racist Events, 25
J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 231, 234 (1999).
Police do not always have an affirmative duty to assist private citizens who are in
danger. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989) (holding that a police detective's failure to provide petitioner with ade-
quate protection against his father's violence did not violate petitioner's rights under
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause). This increases the risk that
bias may also occur if police exercise their discretion not to intervene to help people
of color in distress.
Police misconduct can be particularly harmful to people of color who are already
reticent about reporting to the police for other reasons, such as rape victims, women
subject to domestic violence, and people who have been assaulted for being perceived
as homosexual, bisexual, or transgendered. Police misconduct may make such victims
even less likely to trust officers. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1257 (1991) ("Women of color are often reluctant to call the police [to report
domestic violence], a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people of
color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is
frequently hostile."); Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 122-23 n.122 (1983) (discussing evidence "suggesting that police
behavior may be an especial deterrent to Black women's reporting" rapes, especially
rapes by white men). The officers themselves are less likely to take their crime reports
seriously, and may actively harass these groups. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignor-
ing the Sexualization of Race, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 35 (1999) (noting that "[m] any gays and
lesbians.., distrust law enforcement due to a history of victimization and harassment
by police officers," and that "race might increase the vulnerability of gays, lesbians, bi-
sexuals and the transgendered of color to homophobic violence and subject them to
additional harassment and further abuse by police officers when they report their vic-
timization"); Wriggins, supra, at 104 n.2 (noting that "police often decide not to pursue
rape complaints which may be valid, especially if the complainant is Black").
9 See COLE, supra note 6, at 7 ("White Americans are not likely to want to believe
[the claim that our criminal justice system depends on inequality]. The principle that
all are equal before the law is perhaps the most basic in American law."). Cole argues
that the Supreme Court adopts standards that "presume[] that we all have the same set
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conduct were rare, however, current colorblind statutory interpreta-
tions still play a noxious role by supporting a judicial refusal to ac-
knowledge that racism is pervasive, that it forces many people of color
to tread carefully in their day-to-day lives, and that this is relevant
when police misconduct does occur. This is dangerous for people of
color because judges ensure that their rational and innocent reactions
to police may get them shot.' °
This Comment compares two statutes offering plaintiffs causes of
action against police, 42 U.S.C. § 1983"1 and the Americans with Dis-
12abilities Act of 1990 (ADA), to explore how a colorblind approach to
civil rights has left plaintiffs of color 13 in the lurch with respect to po-
lice misconduct, and to solicit the creation of a race-conscious police
misconduct statute.
14
of experiences vis-i-vis the police, and that none of us has any reason to feel coerced by
an 'ordinary' police encounter." Id. at 27. Whites, in general, are significantly less
likely than blacks to perceive that racial discrimination exists against people of color.
See also, e.g., LEE SIGELMAN & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK AMERICANS' VIEWS OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY: THE DREAM DEFERRED 53 (1991) (indicating that black Americans per-
ceive racism to be more prevalent than white Americans); Lawrence Bobo & James R.
Kluegel, Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes,
58 AM. Soc. REV. 443 (1993) (finding that most whites in America tend to endorse the
notion of equality in principle, but are opposed to many policies designed to enhance
opportunities among blacks).
10 For a discussion ofjudicial responsibility in the matter of police misconduct, see
infra notes 208-13, 223, 234, 238-61, 269-70, 274-77 and accompanying text and Parts
IV.C.1-2. For a lengthy, but by no means exhaustive, catalog of recent deaths due to
police misconduct, see STOLEN LIVES, supra note 8, which provides the age and race of
victims, where they were killed, and the circumstances surrounding their deaths. Many
of the deaths listed reflect rational and innocent responses to the police. The source is
helpful for understanding the nature of police abuse because in many cases it includes
the police officers' stated rationale for using deadly force. This is useful for indicating
that even when responses to the police are belligerent, the force the police use in re-
sponse is excessive and often explicitly racist.
I For the text of§ 1983, see infta note 79.
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For a discussion of the text and purpose of
the ADA, see infra notes 83-95, 128-31 and accompanying text.
13 At the risk of essentializing the experiences of nonwhites, the terms "plaintiff of
color" and "people of color" are used throughout this Comment. Much of the litera-
ture cited refers explicitly to black people. The use of these sources is not intended to
be understood as excluding the presence or validity of literature addressing other ra-
cial identities of color. While acknowledging that the effects of racism on people of
different races, and among people of the same race, vary in innumerable ways, this
Comment seeks to address broad problems in police misconduct law that generally af-
fect most nonwhite groups.
14 This Comment is not intended to prioritize the interests of people of color
above the interests of persons with disabilities, or to suggest that those interests are
necessarily mutually exclusive. Nor does it argue for limitations on the tools available
to individuals with disabilities in police misconduct suits. Rather, the purpose of this
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When a plaintiff in a police misconduct suit has a disability, such
as deafness or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a red flag goes
up warning that a police officer's failure to take adequately the disabil-
ity into consideration may be culpable. 15 The plaintiff's disability will
prompt her attorney to consider making a claim under the ADA, and
the judge hearing the case will be obligated to consider a claim by the
plaintiff that the misconduct was attributable in part to her disability.
By contrast, when a plaintiff in a police misconduct suit is a person of
color, no red flag is raised on account of that. In fact, not only do
judges abstain from noting how race influences the actions of police
officers-they are actively criticized for acknowledging any societal ra-
cial influence at all.'" This occurs despite the fact that race is often the
focal point of misconduct in a way that disability status is not. (Per-
sons with disabilities are not the targets of police harassment by virtue
of their disabled status, but because of behavior that their disability
makes manifest. People of color are often targeted precisely because
they are not white, irrespective of their behavior.) The plaintiff of
color can raise a § 1983 claim, but such a claim is restricted by the
prevailing understanding of equal protection that has developed over
Comment is to use the ADA as a template with which to illustrate that any system offer-
ing protection against police misconduct, the efficacy of which is more dependent
upon a plaintiff proving that her actions are reasonable (because they fall within enu-
merated types of legitimizing conduct) than proving that the defendant officer's ac-
tions are abusive, is insufficient and results in bias against the very group that is most
affected by police misconduct: people of color.
Nor should this Comment be understood as being written on behalf of people of
color, nor to suggest that people of color are necessarily likely to favor a race-conscious
approach to law. Several notable scholars of color have criticized race-conscious ap-
proaches. See, for example, Randall Kennedy, an African American, who in his article
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989), criticizes aspects of
popular Critical Race Theorists' writings. Id. at 1749. Others emphasize that race-
conscious approaches to law need not be mutually exclusive with race-neutral reme-
dies. See, e.g., Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, in KEY WRITINGS,
supra note 6, at 441, 447 ("Abandoning one set of definitions entirely may deprive us of
useful tools in the struggle against racism.").
15 Consider, for example, Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997), in
which the court applied the ADA to the arrest of a deaf man for not responding to the
arresting officers. The court held that "a plaintiff may recover under the ADA where
he can show that (1) he was disabled, (2) the defendants knew or should have known
he was disabled, and (3) the defendants arrested him because of legal conduct related
to his disability." d. at 178; see also infra notes 88, 92-97 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing pertinent portions of the ADA and courts' recognition of the validity of hear-
ing ADA claims against law enforcement entities).
16 See infra notes 240-45 (discussing a recent case where a judge recognized the
prevalence of corruption and racism among police officers and subsequently vacated
his original decision amid claims that the judge engaged in judicial activism).
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the last few decades: that the closest approximation ofjustice is mani-
fest by a colorblind approach to conflicts.
To illustrate the problem, consider two variations on a common
scenario: An individual, person X, is walking down the street in an
area where it is X's experience that police often harass or embarrass
pedestrians, especially pedestrians who are not white. A squad car
pulls up, and X turns around and walks in the other direction to avoid
attracting the attention of the police. The police officers apprehend
X, claiming that X's behavior was "odd," despite the history of police
misconduct against innocent suspects in this area.
In the first variation, assume that X (X,) is of indeterminate race,
and that the officers admit to recognizing X as a local war veteran.
Assume also that the officers are aware that X, suffers from a stress
disorder as the result of his combat experience that makes X nervous
and asocial when confronted by aggressive behavior, particularly from
persons carrying weapons. If the officers refuse to take steps to com-
municate with X and then base their decision to apprehend X, on his
failure to respond to the officers appropriately, X, may have a valid
claim against the police under the ADA. 7 Although Xi's behavior
would be considered atypical, it would be considered legitimate given
X,'s stress disorder.
By contrast, assume that in the second variation X (X) is a person
of color. X has no diagnosed stress disorder. The police, however,
recognize X because they have stopped him on several occasions
without reasonable suspicion, even though they have never arrested
him. X has been visibly disturbed by such stops in the past, and the
police are aware of this. Nonetheless, the officers insist that X2's deci-
sion to avoid the police is "odd,"18 and approach him. Even if X is
verbally and physically abused, it is unlikely that X will prevail if he
files suit charging police misconduct.' 9
A potentially self-reinforcing abuse is apparent. X, is prone to ad-
verse reactions around police because of an unrelated series of events
(his combat experience), while X is prone to adverse reactions to po-
17 See infra notes 93-97, 126 and accompanying text (noting that the ADA has been
applied to law enforcement entities); infra notes 127, 144-48, 151 (noting that the ADA
may also protect disabled individuals with certain mental disorders).
18 See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text (discussing a Second Circuit opin-
ion indicating that an officer's claim that a person's behavior was "odd" satisfies the
requirement of reasonable suspicion, even if the officer's precinct is publicly regarded
as being infamous for its corrupt police).
19 See infra Part I (discussing the difficulty of prevailing in a suit against the po-
lice).
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lice for reasons directly attributable to the police (perhaps even the
arresting officers themselves). Should X bring his ordeal to the atten-
tion of the courts, his reactions will most likely be deemed unreason-
able.20 In effect, the more intimidating and brutal the police are, the
more likely it becomes that they will incite what the courts have
deemed "odd" reactions from the people they approach. Therefore,
it is more likely that the police will be considered justified in their
harassment of innocent people.
A statutory gap becomes apparent. Racism, whether overt or sub-
21tle, can exact a heavy psychological toll on people of color. Police
22misconduct is a prevalent manifestation of racism in this country.
Although the ADA is a potentially effective tool for pursuing police
misconduct suits generally, on behalf of those suffering from some
psychological traumas, plaintiffs of color cannot garner the protec-
tions of the ADA by virtue of the trauma suffered as a result of racially
discriminatory police misconduct. On the other hand, while § 1983
purportedly protects claimants from racial discrimination generally,
§ 1983 is procedurally impotent when applied against police officers.
These statutory deficiencies have resulted in an inequitable status
quo. Certain categories of plaintiffs, such as disabled white individu-
als, have tools available to them with which to approach police mis-
conduct suits that are not available to most people of color (whether
disabled or not). Judges are statutorily obligated to consider aspects
of plaintiff-police interactions in a way that often benefits white plain-
23tiffs and plaintiffs with disabilities in police misconduct suits, but are
not similarly obligated to consider how the plaintiff's race may affect
these interactions.24
The statutory incongruity between the ADA and § 1983 implicitly
offers an inappropriate incentive to plaintiffs' attorneys to portray
20 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing judges' perceptions of the reactions of people of
color to police).
21 Discussing black men in particular, psychiatrists note that "[t]he racist tradition
is pervasive and envelops every American.... [I]t constitutes a heavy psychological
burden." WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 71 (1968).
22 See supra note 8 (describing types and giving examples of such misconduct).
See infra Part III (discussing how the benefits of the ADA are often available to
persons subject to mental and emotional stressors to which whites are exposed, but not
to persons subject to stressors to which people of color are more likely to be exposed).
24 This is true despite evidence that experiences particular to people of color, by
virtue of being exposed to racially discriminatory stressors, may affect plaintiff-police
interactions to an equal or greater extent than factors affecting primarily white and
disabled plaintiffs. Id.
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their clients as primarily atypical individuals without addressing race
as a distinguishing factor. It may entice plaintiffs' attorneys to charac-
terize their clients as persons with disabilities (also considered by
Congress to be a minority2 ), portraying their clients' identities such
that they correspond with prescribed categories of individuals pro-
tected by the ADA.
As a result, the present state of the law as it pertains to police mis-
conduct has serious adverse consequences for plaintiffs of color, both
on the individual level and on the societal level. Individually, persons
suffering from stress disorders as a result of particular instances of ra-
cial discrimination have no direct recourse to the ADA. The impact of
racism is dismissed.
The societal response to misconduct is to draw judicial attention
away from the actions of the defendant police officers and depart-
ments, emphasizing instead the plaintiffs ability to legitimize behavior
(his or her own) that should be understood as reasonable. This sup-
ports a logic whereby victims of police misconduct must prove the rea-
sonableness of their aversion to racism before judges will question the
impropriety of racist police protocol. It also supports the mistaken
conclusion that only persons who develop mental illnesses have ac-
tionable claims against the police. Furthermore, telescoping the criti-
cal focus onto the behavior of one plaintiff, instead of the behavior of
an institution such as a police department, misconstrues the nature of
racism. It suggests that the plaintiffs experience is a solitary deviation
from an otherwise just and equal status quo, instead of recognizing
that racism is institutionalized to the extent that it permeates such a
basic staple of civic structure as law enforcement.
This neglect of the role that race plays in police encounters with
victims of color can be mitigated by statutory revision. Two solutions
present themselves. The first focuses on individual experiences of ra-
cism and the behavior of the plaintiff. It would afford the substantive
5 Infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. This Comment discusses how the
reactions of some people of color to police are characterized as atypical, and in doing
so compares this characterization to that of the behavior of persons with disabilities,
whose behavior is also implied to be atypical-that is, in the minority. This Comment
addresses a prevalent confusion of the notion of "atypical" with the notion of "unrea-
sonable" identified byJody D. Armour and criticizes its occurrence when it emerges
with respect to people of color in police misconduct suits. See infra note 227 and ac-
companying text (elaborating on Armour's distinction). While this Comment ad-
dresses this confusion in the context of circumstances faced by people of color, the
arguments put forth below should not be understood to condone any such confusion
of atypicality and unreasonableness as applied to persons with disabilities. Any inquiry
addressing that issue with the attention it merits is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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protections of the ADA to more people of color by expanding the
definitions of mental illnesses (such as PTSD) to recognize disorders
that arise in response to racist environments. The second solution fo-
cuses on societal racism and the behavior of the errant police defen-
dant. Under the second solution, the procedural advantages unique
to the ADA, which make it a potentially more effective statute for pur-
suing police misconduct claims, would be made more broadly avail-
able to claimants of color to the benefit of citizens and police officers
alike. Even when plaintiffs' experiences of racism do not place them
within the rubric of the ADA, the second solution recognizes police
misconduct as a serious problem in need of correction. The two solu-
tions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Both solutions embrace a
race-conscious approach to the law rather than the prevailing color-
blind approach.
Part I begins by discussing why the traditional criminal and civil
remedies for police misconduct are inadequate. Part II describes the
procedural advantages available to claimants under the ADA that are
not available under traditional civil rights statutes. Part III illustrates
how the ADA is interpreted such that people of color have unequal
access to the status of a viable claimant under the ADA, discussing the
ADA's treatment of PTSD in particular. Part IV critiques the practical
and policy implications of the disparity between the efficacy of the
ADA and the efficacy of the statutory avenues currently open to plain-
tiffs of color. Part IV also suggests making the advantageous proce-
dural provisions of the ADA more broadly available to plaintiffs of
color charging the police with misconduct. Finally, Part V anticipates
and addresses some criticisms of making the statutory changes sug-
gested in Part IV.
I. TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL AND CIVIL REMEDIES ARE INEFFECTIVE FOR
POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATION
A. The Problems of Criminal Prosecution of Police Misconduct
Criminal prosecution of police officers and departments is highly
problematic for plaintiffs, and is unlikely to result in convictions.2 6
Because such prosecutions are so difficult they usually do not succeed
26 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 86, 97 (listing reasons why prosecutors
are unwilling to pursue cases against police officers, and noting that "officers who are
occasionally prosecuted successfully ... do not generally receive long sentences").
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in improving human rights practicesY In New York, for instance, de-
spite scores of fatal shootings in the last two decades, not one officer
was convicted of homicide for an on-duty shooting between 1977 and
1995.28
This is attributable, in part, to the fact that local criminal prosecu-
tions of police officers for excessive force are rare.2 q Local prosecutors
may be hesitant to pursue cases against suspected abusive police offi-
cers for several reasons. First, prosecutors may not be willing to
jeopardize the traditionally close relationship between district attor-
neys and the local police, who work together to prosecute other al-
leged criminals. Human Rights Watch, an organization dedicated to
protecting human rights globally, recently turned its attention to the
United States, evaluating the prevalence of police misconduct in four-
teen major American cities.1 Its studies led to the conclusion that
"[t]here is a natural conflict of interest when district attorneys-who
typically work closely with the police to bring cases against suspected
criminals-are faced with prosecuting those same officers." In juris-
dictions where prosecutors are elected, prosecutions of individual of-
ficers can engender a lack of support among police unions, which may
subsequently cost a prosecutor an election."
3 Prosecutions of police
officers are also rare because it is difficult to convince juries that anS 34
officer committed a crime, and did not merely make an understand-
able mistake. Third, in some jurisdictions, there are special proceed-
27 Id. at 85.
28 Id. at 87.
29 Id. at 85. In New York City, the Department Advocate's Office regularly fails to
refer criminal cases of misconduct to the District Attorney. MARK GREEN, OFFICE OF
THE NEW YORK CITY PUB. ADVOCATE & THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, DISCIPLINING
POLICE: SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 51 (2000).
so HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 86.
3 See id. at I ("The cities examined are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Indi-
anapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Portland,
Providence, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.").
32 See id. at 86 (noting "a particular reticence in bringing charges against officers
who have been 'productive' and who have worked closely with the district attorney's
office").
33 See id. at 38, 86 ("In some jurisdictions, district attorneys are elected and are
aware that the powerful police unions and their supporters may withdraw their support
if a police officer is prosecuted.").
See COLE, supra note 6, at 8 ("The rhetoric of the criminal justice system sends
the message that our society carefully protects everyone's constitutional rights, but in
practice the rules assure that law enforcement prerogatives will generally prevail over
the rights of minorities and the poor.").
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 86 (commenting that "by only pur-
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ings that provide additional protections for police officers.3 Finally,
there is a dearth of information about systems for reviewing possibly
prosecutable crimes.37
When local prosecutors decline to pursue police misconduct
cases, the federal government has a responsibility to step in if the
plaintiff's civil rights have been violated." Commentators have identi-
fled a trend of federal passivity to police miscondut: Federal prose-
cutors rarely take on cases in which the local prosecutor attempted to
indict but failed."0 Even when federal officials do intervene to investi-
gate actively cases that local prosecutors declined, prosecutions do not
fare much better than they do at the local level due to strategic prob-
lems that hamper convictions. For example, Steven D. Clymer, a law
professor at Cornell University, notes that it is difficult to prove police
misconduct in court.41 Jurors historically presume guilt or innocence
in favor of the police officers. 4' Further, federal prosecutors rely on
the FBI to investigate local police misconduct allegations, but inquir-
ies may be limited to information provided by the very same local po-
lice agency that is itself under scrutiny.3
Police misconduct, therefore, often is immune to successful
criminal prosecution. In 1996, the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Justice Department received 11,721 complaints regarding in-
stances of police misconduct.44 Only twenty-two of these complaints
•45
were filed as cases of official misconduct. Considering other types of
cases prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division, this rate of conviction
underscores the singularly low rate of prosecutorial success in the po-
lice misconduct context: while there is nearly a 100% rate of success
for cases that are fully prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division not in-
volving official misconduct, the conviction rate of police cases in 1996
suing rare, overwhelmingly strong cases, the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution of
officers is undermined significantly").
36 Id.
37 Id. at 86, 106-10.
38 Id. at 89.
See id. at 91 (maintaining that "lack of funding and staffing at the Criminal Sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Division [of the Justice Department] ... reflects the govern-
ment's overall lack of commitment to prosecuting these types of cases").
40 Id. at 99.
41 Id. at 85 (citing Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at
62, 64).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 96.




Law enforcement officers also account for almost all the acquittals
41
in cases prosecuted by the Civil Rights Division . When officers are
prosecuted, but subsequently acquitted, they almost always avoid any
further discipline or they get theirjobs back through arbitration.
4 s Fir-
ing even the most violent officers can be "nearly impossible.,
4
0) When• 50
convicted, officers spend little or no time incarcerated. In New York
City, in fact, officers responsible for substantiated complaints of mis-
conduct are more likely to be promoted than dismissed,
5' and the po-
lice department awards medals to officers at the same time that those
officers are receiving civilian complaints.
2 Police misconduct clearly
is not taken seriously.
B. The Problems of Traditional Civil Prosecution of Police Misconduct
Given the criminal system's failure to prosecute police misconduct
effectively, some victims have turned to the pursuit of civil suits as an
option superior to criminal suits. 53 Indeed, "deflecting criticisms re-
garding the government's failure to fulfill its obligation to ensure the
rights of individuals within the United States are protected," govern-
ment officials themselves laud civil remedies as the most effective
46 See id. at 94 (pointing out that civil rights cases in general are prosecuted less
often than other categories of offenses handled by the Justice Department).
47 Id. at 103.
48 See id. at 72 ("Even in cases where heads of police departments have ordered the
dismissal of officers known to be brutal, the officers have won reinstatement, with back
pay, through arbitration or court appeals.").
49 See id. (discussing the findings of a series of investigative articles in the Philadel-
phia Inquirer that looked at cases occurring between 1992 and 1995).
50 See id. at 99 (noting that in 1994 and 1995, twenty-five defendants out of ninety-
six convicted were sentenced to three months or less in prison).
51 GREEN, supra note 29, at 62.
52 Id. at 64.
53 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 122 ("Police abuse experts had long
recommended giving federal authorities power to bring civil actions against police de-
partments engaging in a pattern or practice of misconduct."). State courts have seen a
rise in civil suits for police misconduct as well. On this point authors Michael Avery,
David Rudovsky, and Karen M. Blum note:
With decisions of the United States Supreme Court limiting access of civil
rights plaintiffs to the federal courts, the increasing conservatism of lower
federal judges, and the liberalization of some state court decisions in the con-
stitutional area, an increasing number of plaintiffs began filing § 1983 claims
in state court in the 1980s and 1990s.
AvERY ET AL., supra note 8, § 2.1 (citations omitted).
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means for redress in police misconduct cases. 4 Section 1983 theoreti-
55cally provides such civil protection. The statute is understood to
serve two purposes when applied in the context of police misconduct:
It is meant both to compensate the victims and to hold officers and
departments accountable to constitutionally required standards of
conduct.,6 In the end, however, officers whose actions may have been
criminal are still free to administer the law as they see fit, and the vic-
tim is dismissed, uncompensated. 7
Several impediments to the success of a typical § 1983 claim have
been noted as being particularly problematic. First, the doctrine of
qualified immunity "serves to make the civil rights plaintiffs burden
almost insurmountable. ,18  Qualified immunity will be available as a
defense for an officer "when a reasonable official would not have
known that his actions would violate a constitutional right that was
'clearly established' at the time of the incident."59 The immunity is
54 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 118.
55 Section 1983 is meant to provide compensation for federal statutory violations
or constitutional deprivations caused by state officials or the operation of state laws.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,172 (1961).
56 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 119.
57 See id. ("Civil lawsuits are limited in important respects that undermine their
effectiveness in providing a remedy for past violations and in providing protection
against future police abuse.").
58 James C. Harrington, The ADA and Section 1983: Walking Hand in Hand: Using
the Americans with Disabilities Act to Re-open the Civil Rights Door, 19 REV. LITIG. 435, 438
(2000); see also AVERY ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.4 ("Qualified immunity has emerged as
the most significant and problematic defense to claims of civil rights violations. Its de-
velopment in the Supreme Court has been marked by ad hoc decision making, con-
flicting rationales, and a high degree of doctrinal manipulation.").59
AVERY ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.4; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615
(1999) (finding that "it was not unreasonable for a police officer in April 1992 to have
believed that bringing media observers along during the execution of an arrest war-
rant... was lawful," thereby conferring qualified immunity); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232-33 (1991) (holding that protection arises when a public official claims to have
acted in an objectively reasonable manner with regard to a law that is not clearly set-
tled); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (declining to "make an excep-
tion to the general rule of qualified immunity for cases involving allegedly unlawful
warrantless searches of innocent third parties' homes in search of fugitives"); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."). The official's subjective motivation is
not relevant to the qualified immunity defense. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (discussing
how an analysis of qualified immunity should be limited to the "objective reasonable-
ness of an official's conduct"). The Supreme Court described the test for immunity as
laid out in Harlow as a "fair warning standard": if the federal law was clearly estab-
lished, the official is on notice that violation of that federal law may lead to personal
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"immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." 60 "While
juries are supposed to focus on whether the officer's conduct was ob-
jectively reasonable," in fact, "they may focus instead on what the offi-
cer reasonably believed about the facts."6 ' The recent decision in Sau-
cier v. Katz further confuses the matter of objective reasonableness, in
that it seems to add a good faith reasonableness standard to the previ-
ous objective reasonableness test.62 As a result, " [n]ow we have the po-
lice officer's reasonable understanding of how much force is constitu-
tional confusing the issue of how reasonable the conduct is.,
6 3
Applying qualified immunity to constitutional claims litigated under
an objective reasonableness standard gives the official two layers of
reasonableness protection: one under the Fourth Amendment, and
another under qualified immunity. 4 "This can lead to the awkward
conclusion that the official acted . . .reasonably (for immunity pur-
poses) [, but] unreasonabl[y] (for constitutional purposes) ... ,,6
monetary liability. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997).
60 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
61 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 120.
62 E-mail from Aaron Frishberg, Esq., to Thorne Clark (Jan. 7, 2002, 1:49:46 EST)
(on file with author). Saucier establishes that after an initial inquiry into whether a
constitutional right is violated, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established .... The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." 533
U.S. 194, 196 (2001) (citation omitted). Saucier rejects the notion that a finding of ex-
cessive force precludes the qualified immunity defense: just because an officer's con-
duct has been determined to be unreasonable under the excessive force analysis does
not necessarily mean that a reasonable officer could not have concluded that deadly
force was constitutional. Even before Saucier, the objective reasonableness of the force
an officer used was an issue. It is hard to determine, in court, what a reasonable officer
would find constitutional. See, e.g., Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1186 n.13
(11 th Cir. 2001) (holding that a jury could find the police shooting of plaintiff's dece-
dent to have been constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but
that because there were no earlier cases with similar facts, the officers could not be
charged with the knowledge that their actions would violate the plaintiff's rights). Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), holds that good faith on the part of the arresting officers is
not enough to override the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant arrested by the
officers without a warrant. That case, however, only addresses the arrestee's rights, not
the officer's liability.
63 E-mail from Aaron Frishberg, Esq., to Thorne Clark Uan. 22, 2002, 01:55:58
EST) (on file with author). Frishberg adds that lower courts may be more likely to
dismiss more plaintiffs' claims, armed with the double-barreled reasonableness stan-
dard.
See supra note 62 (explaining the decision in Saucier). The qualified immunity
defense applies even when, as in Fourth Amendment challenges to arrests and
searches, the constitutional standard itself is an objective reasonableness standard.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
65 Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, in 1 17TH ANNUAL
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Based on this standard, police officers usually secure qualified immu-
nity,6 6 and only the most flagrant, shocking conduct-not just ineptacti ns m ill def at q aliied " . 67
actions-will defeat qualified immunity. Having to meet that bur-
den, therefore, greatly decreases the likelihood that a plaintiffs claim
will succeed.6 s
Second, the interlocutory appellate mechanism, created by the
United States Supreme Court, facilitates review of a denial of summary
judgment, in favor of qualified immunity for an official.60 Such an ap-
peal significantly delays litigation and may require the plaintiff to
overcome a claim of immunity with only minimal opportunities to en-
SEcTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 13, 65 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. H-665, 2001).
6 Harrington, supra note 58, at 438. The court in Leong v. City of Detroit stated:
Even if it were concluded, upon resolving.., factual disputes in the plaintiffs
favor, that an officer's use of deadly force was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the officer still would be entitled to qualified immunity if, under
the present state of the law, a reasonable officer could have concluded-albeit
mistakenly-that deadly force was authorized under the circumstances.
151 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also Willingham v. Loughnan, 261
F.3d 1178, 1186 n.13 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Saucier directly rejects [the] argument that a
finding of excessive force precludes the qualified immunity defense. That Defendants'
conduct has been ultimately determined to be unreasonable ... does not decide
whether the law was already clearly established at the time Defendants acted that what
they were doing.., necessarily violated federal law."). Even prior to Saucier, officers
often secured qualified immunity. See, e.g., Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for the initial
detention and request to the plaintiff to identify himself because he might reasonably
have concluded that the suspect had committed a crime, even though the officer testi-
fied that as he approached plaintiff, he saw nothing in particular to indicate he was
engaged in any crime, and that he knew silent alarms that were tripped at the auto re-
pair shop where plaintiff had just dropped off his car were tripped by innocent people
"all the time"); Napier v. Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 188 (1st Cir. 1999) (arguing that an
officer is entitled to immunity unless a reasonable officer in his position would have
known that the Graham standard labeled his conduct excessive); Gold v. City of Miami,
121 F.3d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (securing qualified immunity for defendant offi-
cers); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-16 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); Finnegan v. Foun-
tain, 915 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 873-
74 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (8th Cir. 1978)
(same).
67 Alton v. Tex. A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Snyder v.
Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 801 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding qualified immunity for a po-
lice officer who shot an unarmed man in the back at a range of six to ten inches, while
the victim was stuck in the mud in a swamp).
68 Furthermore, "[a]lthough a municipality has no qualified immunity under
§ 1983, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove the requisite deliberate indiffer-
ence ... when individual defendants prevail on the qualified immunity defense on the
ground that the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident." AVERY ET
AL., supra note 8, § 3.23.
69 Harrington, supra note 58, at 438.
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gage in discovery. Thus, rather than establishing that the allegedly
guilty officers have operated within the bounds of the law, this
mechanism impedes discovery to such an extent that the court is
never formally apprised of the officers' inappropriate, or even crimi-
nal, action.
Third, while courts may on a rare occasion find municipalities li-
able, the ruling in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York requires that the plaintiff establish a municipality's policy, cus-
72tom, or longstanding policy-like practice of abuse. The ruling in Los
Angeles v. Lyons 3 requires a showing of a real and immediate likeli-
hood that the alleged misconduct will happen to that particular plain-
tiff again, thereby reducing the likelihood of enjoining an offensive
74practice .
Even when remedies are awarded, only actual damages are avail-
able, not punitive damages. 75 Cases involving inadequate police train-
ing are particularly problematic since the Supreme Court's imposition
in 1989 of a separate "state of mind requirement," which demands
that the plaintiffs prove deliberate indifference to abuse on the part of
the municipality.
76
Fourth, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is often applied to po-
lice misconduct cases. Suits against state officials in their official ca-
pacities are considered suits against that official's office, and are
therefore treated as suits against the state itself.77 Because sovereign
immunity prevents plaintiffs from recovering damages against a state,
which is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
70 See id. (noting also that the appeal saves the officer the time and expense of a
defense, and permits her to remain employed).
71 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978).
72 Id. at 691-92.
73 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
74 In that case, the plaintiff was subjected to a stranglehold by the police, adminis-
tered with such force that it rendered him unconscious and damaged his larynx, de-
spite the fact that the situation did not justify the use of deadly force. Id. at 97-98. No
injunction, however, was issued to prevent further use of strangleholds since the plain-
tiff could not show that he likely would suffer the same violence again, even though
others might. Id. at 111. The court justified its ruling with the rationale that
"[a]bstract injury is not enough" to issue an injunction. Id. at 101.
75 Harrington, supra note 58, at 439.
76 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 119 (citing a report by the law firm
of Piper & Marbury, dated June 29, 1995, regarding the civilian complaint review
board in Washington, D.C., citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1990)).
77 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).
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Constitution, plaintiffs are limited to securing equitable remedies.
II. USING THE ADA AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PURSUING
POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATION
A. How the ADA Works When Used Against Government Entities:
A Brief Introduction
Congress has expressed a willingness to curb unconstitutional dis-
crimination based on race, evidenced in part by the passage of
§ 1983.' 9 It has also expressed an interest in curbing discrimination
based on disabilities, as evidenced by the passage of the ADA.80 If the
allegedly discriminating party, however, is a police officer or depart-
ment, the protections against racial discrimination are rendered inef-
fective under § 1983. The ADA may offer plaintiffs greater potential
to prevail in police misconduct claims than § 1983.
Professor James Harrington has emerged as a leader of efforts to
use an ADA-oriented approach to police misconduct litigation. He
emphasizes that the ADA "provides relief in a great number of situa-
tions in which § 1983 does not," and in some situations bolsters the
effectiveness of § 1983.81 He has referred to the ADA as "the most
comprehensive civil rights law passed by Congress, "82 protecting peo-
ple with disabilities from discrimination based on disability, perceived
disability, or association with the disabled. Specifically, the ADA ex-
plains that "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to an individ-
78 Harrington, supra note 58, at 439-40.
79 Section 1983 states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999). "Rejecting the restrictive interpretations previously
made of § 1983, the Supreme Court set forth an expansive construction of that statute,
emphasizing the intention of Congress to create a broad federal remedy for violations
of constitutional rights." AVERY ET AL., supra note 8, § 1:1.
80 See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
ADA).
81 Harrington, supra note 58, at 437.
82 Id.
PROTECTION FROM PROTECTION
ual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment." "3 The statute also requires "reasonable modification to ac-
commodate individuals with disabilities. 8 4  Harrington notes that
"[t] he exceptions are few and limited.""
Most ADA claims are sustained under Titles I, II, and III of the
Act.86 Title I provides protection in employment situations."' Title II
ensures that government agencies are responsible for modifying their
programs and premises to accommodate people with disabilities.88 Ti-
tle III extends the protections of Title II to cover private businesses. 89
Title IV deals with accommodation as it applies to telecommunica-
tions,90 and Title V further enumerates miscellaneous provisions. 91 Ti-
tles II and III "may be enforced through a private cause of action for
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief (as well as attorney's fees,
costs, and litigation expenses) or through a Department ofJustice en-
forcement action."
9 2
The broad language of the ADA, along with the absence of any
stated exceptions, has given rise to plaintiffs' attempts to apply Title II
claims to areas involving law enforcement.93 Section 12132 of the ADA
states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity."94 A "public entity" in-
cludes "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other in-
strumentality of a State or States or local government. "95 The Su-
preme Court9 6 and lower federal courts97 have explicitly acknowledged
83 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
84 See Harrington, supra note 58, at 441 (referring to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(2),
12182(2) (A) (ii)).
85 See id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(3)).
86 Id. at 440.
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
88 Id. §§ 12131-12165.
89 Id. §§ 12181-12189.
90 47 U.S.C. § 225.
91 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
92 See Harrington, supra note 58, at 441 (referring to §§ 12133, 12188).
93 See infra notes 96-97 (listing cases where plaintiffs brought claims against law en-
forcement and corrections officials under the ADA).
94 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
95 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (B).
96 See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (involving a prison in-
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the validity of applying the ADA to actions against law enforcement
agencies as well.
B. Wat the ADA Offers over and Above Traditional Civil Rights Statutes
While he does not consider plaintiffs of color in particular, Har-
rington argues that the ADA is often more useful than § 1983 for po-
lice misconduct litigation generally.!8 Although it is difficult to prevail
even with ADA claims in many areas of the law," Harrington and
other practitioners' °° note that courts have held that the ADA consti-
tutionally may circumvent several of the technical obstacles to secur-
mate who sued corrections officials under the ADA for discrimination due to the in-
mate's medical history of hypertension).
97 See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the de-
fendant Williamson County Sheriff's Department is a public entity, and therefore is
obligated to adhere to Title II's mandates for equal protection of people with disabili-
ties); Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 997 (6th Cir. 1999) (involving a hearing impaired
inmate who sued employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections under the
ADA); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 1999) (involving a suit
filed under the ADA by plaintiff inmates against a department of corrections for segre-
gating the inmate population according to the results of HIV screenings); Gorman v.
Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1998) (addressing a paraplegic who was injured
while being transported after his arrest and filed suit under the ADA against members
of the city Board of Police Commissioners, the Chief of Police, and the officer who
drove the transport vehicle); Chisolm v. Manimon, 97 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622 (D.N.J.
2000) (noting that the ADA's application to public entities may apply in a prison con-
text); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (D.N.J.
2000) (involving a deaf and functionally illiterate plaintiff who sued the police under
the ADA); Higgins v. Beckworth, No. 5:00-cv-78, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12708, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2000) (noting that the ADA applies to inmates in state prisons);
Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1239 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that the ADA
contains no limitations that would prevent its application to prisons); Lewis v. Truitt,
960 F. Supp. 175, 176-77 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying the ADA to the arrest of a deaf
man for not responding to the arresting officers, even though arresting officers knew
or should have known that the man could not hear); Barber v. Guay, 910 F. Supp. 790,
802 (D. Me. 1995) (addressing a claim that plaintiff's being denied proper police pro-
tection and fair treatment during arrest due to his disability and deciding the claim is a
valid cause of action under the ADA).
See Harrington, supra note 58, at 437 ("There are five major impediments to
success in typical § 1983 litigation .... A quick overview of these immunities and prac-
tices demonstrates the pitfalls of § 1983 actions, and illustrates how the ADA sur-
mounts these roadblocks in many instances.").
99 See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 271, 271
(2000) ("[The] belief that Title I of the [ADA] protects an indi.vidual from employ-
ment discrimination based on psychiatric disability or perceived psychiatric disability
amounts to a delusion of rights.").
See Frishberg, supra note 63 (identifying the ADA standard of respondeat supe-
rior as an advantage over § 1983 Monell liability).
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ing remedies for abuse at the hands of police officers mentioned
above, while civil rights statutes do not.
1. Interlocutory Appeal and Immunity
Because ADA actions lie against government entities rather than
the individuals employed by them, the problems of qualified immu-
nity, municipal immunity, and interlocutory appeal l°' do not come
into play in ADA litigation."" Although the Supreme Court recently
struck down the ability of the ADA to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
103ment sovereign immunity of states, that decision has no bearing on
substate government entities, such as municipalities or counties.10
101 See supra Part 1.B (discussing these problems).
102 Harrington, supra note 58, at 442.
103 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (stating
that "[t]he legislative record of the ADA... fails to show that Congress... identif[ied]
a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled," and
thus did not support abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suits for money damages under Title I of the ADA). Despite Garrett, a statute created
for the purpose of curbing police misconduct might still be salvaged from similar sov-
ereign immunity impediments. A pattern of irrational state discrimination with re-
spect to police misconduct arguably could be established for some states. See, e.g.,
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (providing an example of a situation in which the
state's own attorney general admitted that the state troopers treated minority motorists
differently than white motorists). Even if a record were established, the Garrett Court
still feared that "the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the States would
raise ... concerns as to congruence and proportionality." 531 U.S. at 372. Specifically,
the Court held that the accommodation duty under the ADA exceeded what was con-
stitutionally required by making it the employer's duty to prove it would suffer hard-
ship from accommodation. See id. ("For example ... it would be entirely rational (and
therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities .... ). Therefore, the Court
held that the Constitution requires that the complaining party negate the reasonable
basis for the employer's decision. Id. For the purposes of constructing a police mis-
conduct statute, one could infer from the Court's reasoning that if a statute were to
require a plaintiff to negate the reasonableness of a police officer's decision to act in a
certain manner (assuming for the moment that a plaintiff could do so), such a statute
would not similarly exceed the Constitution's requirements. If one could make the
case that it would not be "entirely rational" for police to engage in misconduct against
people of color more than they do against whites, then the reasoning in Garrett would
not similarly apply to a police misconduct statute for people of color.
Finally, the Court specified that "[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh
Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in fed-
eral court." Id. at 363 (emphasis added). Though it is unlikely, if a state's legislature
voted to adopt a statute abrogating that state's immunity (based on its own failure to
correct the problem of police misconduct), it could conceivably do so.
104 See id. at 369 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to
units of local government.").
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2. Respondeat Superior
The ADA does not require proof of intentional discrimination if• • 105
there is a showing of a practice that in fact discriminates. Thus, ac-
tions of a government employee-whether they are explicitly dis-
criminatory or have a discriminatory effect-are grounds for liability
against the government entity. This is the equivalent of respondeat
superior liability. By contrast, Monell v. New York City Department of So-
cial Services°" holds that a municipality is not vicariously liable for the
acts of its employees in civil rights actions.07 To impose municipal li-
ability under Monell, the plaintiff must prove that a municipal policy
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2001) (noting that the term "discriminate" in-
cludes "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of
the disability of such applicant or employee"); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (noting
that "discriminate" includes using standards, criteria, or methods of administration
"that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability"). Commentors also
have weighed in. ProfessorJacobi observed:
After reciting the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act describing Con-
gress's appreciation of the degree of intentional and unintentional discrimi-
nation faced by the disabled.., the Court stated, "These statements would
ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting
from action that discriminated by effect as well as design."
John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 95, 127 n.192 (1999) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
297 (1985)); see also Diane L. Kimberlin & Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and
Update: What Has the Supreme Court Done to Disability Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 579, 605
(2000) ("Employers may not use standards, criteria, or methods of administration that
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability .... Thus, like many other
anti-discrimination statutes, the ADA prohibits both intentional discrimination and
unintentional discrimination .... ). In addition, the Supreme Court in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992),
strongly heralded that, absent express congressional direction to the contrary,
the federal courts have wide latitude to award any appropriate relief. Con-
trary to many recent federal court decisions requiring "intentional discrimina-
tion," Supreme Court precedent establishes that such damages are inappro-
priate under Title II only if the public entity does not have notice of the
potential for liability.
Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Disabling the Relationship Between Intentional Discrimination and
Compensatory Damages Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 592, 622 (1998). But see id. at 593 (noting that the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona ruled in Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, No. CIV-95-260-PHX-RCB,
slip op. at 6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 1996), that the plaintiff "needed to prove that the city
'intentionally discriminated' to recover compensatory damages").
106 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
107 See id. at 691 ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respon-
deat superior theory."). The case, however, also held that a municipality is not immune
from liability for engaging in its own unconstitutional policies. Id.
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or custom exists that caused the constitutional violation at issue. 
10
Courts have also required proof of causation and culpability, such that
the policy is the "moving force" behind the violation and there is an
"affirmative link" between the policy and the violation.1
9 Monell liabil-
ity is difficult for plaintiffs to prove."') The actions of rogue officers, or
undisciplined police forces as a whole, therefore remain unaccounted
for by local police departments in § 1983 suits, slipping through the
cracks one incident at a time.
3. Police Self-Evaluation and Modification
The ADA has given rise to Department of Justice regulations that
implement the ADA's requirement that government entities conduct
self-evaluations of their services for persons with disabilities.' Courts
have further held that inadequate government appropriations and
lack of funds do notjustify a government agency's failure to conduct a
thorough self-evaluation and to modify its program."
2 "When appro-
priate training and policies are lacking," notes Harrington, "a creative
plaintiff can use the requirement of self-evaluation and modification
to push for better training programs and proper policies.""
l3 ADA
beneficiaries, therefore, are entitled to declaratory judgment regard-
ing a government entity's failure to evaluate itself effectively, and to
injunctions requiring that appropriate modifications 
be made.' 4
4. Cruel and Unusual Conditions of Confinement
Another area where the ADA may operate more effectively than
§ 1983 is with respect to confinement conditions in prisons and jails.
The Supreme Court has explicitly extended the ADA's purview to
cover state corrections facilities. "' While federal courts hearing
108 AVERYET AL., supranote 8, § 4:15.
109 Id. (quoting City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985), and Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
110 See id. § 4:16 (noting that "one may still expect both factual and legal issues to
be hotly contested where municipal liability claims are made" and that "[i]n general
the area is not an easy one for plaintiffs").
1 28 C.F.R. § 35.105(a)-(b) (2001), cited in Harrington, supra note 58, at 445.
112 L.C. by Ziming v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1998), affd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded by 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Harrington, supra note 58, at 446
(citing Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Harrington, supra note 58, at 446.
114 Id.
115 Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
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§ 1983 cases alleging "cruel and unusual" conditions in prisons accord
"enormous deference"16 to prison officials,"' the ADA "requires offi-
cials to make a reasonable accommodation to the needs of a prisoner
with a disability."" 8 For example, suicide while in confinement may be
treated differently under the ADA than under § 1983."'" Unlike
§ 1983, the ADA establishes an affirmative duty to accommodate per-
sons with mental illness and suicidal tendencies, putting the onus on
prison officials to learn affirmatively to act in an appropriate manner
with the prisoners. 20 Furthermore, Title III of the ADA applies to pri-
vate prisons and jails, where § 1983 does not apply.'21
5. Litigation Expenses
ADA actions permit "a potentially broad recovery of a successful
attorney's out-of-pocket expenses as well as attorney's fees and
:16 Harrington, supra note 58, at 447.1 7
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (requiring that prison officials
who recklessly disregard a substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety be liable un-
der the Eighth Amendment).
118 Harrington, supra note 58, at 447. Harrington adds:
Because the ADA places an affirmative burden on the officials, it may some-
times be easier for a prisoner with a disability to prevail under the ADA than
under § 1983. In some instances, a court may even look to the ADA as a way
of informing 8th or 14th Amendment standards. This latter approach might
offer great promise in jail conditions litigation by prisoners with disabilities.
Id. at 447-48 (citation omitted).
19 See, e.g., Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1997)
(analyzing issues of liability under § 1983 for an inmate suicide). To hold a municipal-
ity accountable under § 1983 for an "episodic act or omission" leading to suicide, the
plaintiff must show that the municipal employee violated clearly established constitu-
tional rights of the inmate with subjective deliberate indifference, and that the viola-
tion resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective
deliberate indifference. Id. at 738 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see also, e.g., Hare v.
City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 328 n.I (5th Cir. 1998) (rendering judgment in favor of
officers who knew and believed the decedent female prisoner was suicidal, but did not
remove a blanket from her cell because they believed she was not strong enough to
hang herself, and who only checked her cell hourly); id. (discussing the trustee who
discovered her hanging in the cell and left her hanging, although it was determined
that she might have survived with emergency treatment). As such, "the less officials
know about appropriate conduct with respect to potentially suicidal inmates, the less
objective legal responsibility they have," which diminishes motivation to "cajole jail of-
ficials into implementing appropriate training." Harrington, supra note 58, at 450.
120 Harrington, supra note 58, at 450. Harrington suggests that Title III standards
may "help define the parameters of reasonable care and negligence in cases involving
prisoners with disabilities." Id. at 452.
121 See, e.g., Martin v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3-97-CV-2895-BD (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(settling for monetary damages in a suicide case alleging inappropriate self-medication
for a mentally ill and suicidal inmate in a private correctional facility).
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costs. ' ' 122 Creating an incentive for lawyers to accept ADA cases as a
matter of national policy, Congress designed the ADA to facilitate the
plaintiffs attorney's recovery of the expenses of ADA cases. 12 3 While
the civil rights statutes, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provide for attorney's
fees, costs, and expert fees, § 1988(b) and (c) does not allow fees
against a judicial officer unless the officer acted "clearly in excess" of.... 124
the officer's jurisdiction. By contrast, the ADA does not protect a
judicial officer from fee collection.
III. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ADA Is BIASED AGAINST
PEOPLE OF COLOR
The ADA therefore offers a viable alternative to § 1983 causes of
action on behalf of victims of police misconduct who, due to disabili-
ties, may be prone to have unique interactions with law enforcement
officials, and who must be provided special accommodation." In-
deed, "[t]he areas in which ADA seems to be most applicable," Har-
rington asserts, "involve accommodation of physical disabilities, ap-
propriate use of force, mental illness calls, and the need for
interpreting."'
17
Congress, relying on census data and other studies, decided that
individuals with disabilities "are a discrete and insular minority"2 8
who, "as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are se-
12 Harrington, supra note 58, at 461 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994)). The stat-
ute provides:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chap-
ter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation ex-
penses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the
same as a private individual.
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994).
123 See Harrington, supra note 58, at 462-63 ("Congress passed § 12205 of the ADA
as an incentive for private attorneys to take ADA cases and thus aid in the enforcement
of the ADA as a matter of national policy.").
124 Id. at 461.
125 Id.
126 See, for example, Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D. Ind. 1997), in
which a deaf grandfather filed suit under the ADA after he was arrested for conduct
that occurred when officers arrived to transfer custody of his granddaughter. The
court held that the grandfather had a right to be informed of the officers' authority,
and that the grandfather could recover on his claim if the officers knew he was deaf,
failed to try to communicate with him, and then arrested him for not responding ap-
propriately. Id.
27 Harrington, supra note 58, at 453.
128 42 U.S.C. § 12101'(a) (7) (1994).
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verely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educa-
tionally. '029 Congress's stated purpose in enacting the ADA was "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"1 3 and "to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority.., in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with dis-
abilities."'3'
The Supreme Court agrees with Congress's assessment. It "has
recognized that the ADA contains an integration mandate in addition
to its non-discrimination and accommodation mandates."32 This in-
tegration regulation requires that a "public entity must assist persons
with disabilities as much as possible in being a full member of soci-
ety"' 133 by administering programs "in the most integrated setting ap-
propriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.' 3 4 The
Eighth Circuit, echoing the Supreme Court, pronounced that the
regulatory obligation to modify policies and practices requires law en-
forcement entities to change policies that result in discriminatory ar-
rests or abuse of people with disabilities. Plaintiff responses to po-
lice that otherwise might be considered atypical or suspicious may
even be recognized as legitimate under the ADA. 30
The courts have interpreted the term "disability" as it is described
in the ADA' 37 to include various physical conditions, determined on a
case-by-case basis, such as cystic fibrosis, M' asthma, 40 diabetes, 4 ' epi-
129 Id. § 12101 (a)(6).
130 Id. § 12101 (b) (1).
131 Id. § 12101 (b) (4).
32 Harrington, supra note 58, at 460.
l33 Id.
:34 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999)).
',3 Harrington, supra note 58, at 454 (citing Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
190 See supra notes 15, 126 (discussing one example of such a case, Lewis v. Truitt,
960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997)).
'37 See supra Part II.A (discussing the ADA in relation to government entities).
38 See Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 145 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that the de-
termination of whether an individual has disabilities under the ADA must be "decided
on a case-by-case basis"), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999).13 See Emery v. Caravan of Dreams, 879 F. Supp. 640, 642 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff was "substantially impaired in the major life function of breath-
ing"), af6'd, 85 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1996).140
See Valentine v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1292-93 (N.D. Iowa
1996) ("[O]n this record.., it is undisputed that [the plaintiff's] asthma is a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.").
141 See Sarsycki v. United Parcel Serv., 862 F. Supp. 336, 340 (W.D. Okla. 1996)
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rely on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
of the American Psychiatric Association for definitions of PTSD50 and
other similar stress disorders, often in cases involving alleged viola-
tions of the ADA.
15 '
The list of PTSD-causing stressors enumerated in the DSM appears
to be ambiguously conceived, however, because stressors not men-
tioned produce symptoms that also would satisfy the DSM's own crite-
152ria for a diagnosis of PTSD. Indeed, there is evidence that the DSM
definition of PTSD adopted by the courts may be arbitrarily too nar-153
row. Some clinicians have grown suspicious of the validity of the
150 The DSM-IV states:
The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor
involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threat-
ened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or
witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical in-
tegrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, se-
rious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or
other close associate.
DSM-IV, supra note 149, at 424. The symptoms recognized by the DSM-IV as indicative
of PTSD, when two or more of them are present, are: (1) difficulty sleeping or staying
asleep; (2) irritability or outbursts of anger; (3) difficulty concentrating; (4) hypervigi-
lance; and (5) exaggerated startle response. Id. at 428.
151 See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F.3d 167, 181 (3d Cir.
2001) (relying on the DSM-IV's definition of what constitutes an "adjustment disorder"
in a case where plaintiff filed suit alleging violation of the ADA based on such disor-
der); EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (refusing to find de-
fendant's long-term disability benefit plan, which specifies limits of benefits to persons
suffering mental or emotional distress as defined in the most current edition of the
DSM, to be in violation of the ADA); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 227
(D.N.J. 2000) (acknowledging the validity of plaintiff's submission of a diagnosis of
PTSD as defined by the DSM-IV, and requiring that defendant be given the opportu-
nity to verify that diagnosis); Zale v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 3:97CV00125(JBA),
2000 WL 306943, at *1 & n.1 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2000) (reviewing plaintiffs submission
of a definition of PTSD as provided in various editions of the DSM); Calovine v. City of
Bridgeport, No. 3:94CV00379(WWE), 1998 WL 171443, at *8 (D. Conn.Jan. 27, 1998)
(finding that a doctor's testimony regarding PTSD based on the DSM-IV was proper,
over defendant's objections); In re Matthew S., 1999 WL 545359, at *6-7 nn.8-9 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 16, 1999) (considering counsel's reliance on the DSM-IV's definition of
personality disorder). But see Williams v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, No. 98 Civ.
3816(RMB), 2000 WL 33175735, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2000) (noting that plaintiff
offered "little evidence that her (stress-related) mental condition(s) constitute 'im-
pairment' under the ADA," even though plaintiff submitted that a social worker diag-
nosed her with Generalized Anxiety Disorder as defined by the DSM-IV).
152KIRTLAND C. PETERSON ET AL., POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: A
CLINICIAN'S GUIDE 135 (1991) (noting that diagnoses of PTSD are denied in "some
patients present with sufficiently intense symptoms, but without the necessary stressor
(these are referred to as 'idiosyncratic' disorders)").
153 Recently, some doctors have questioned "whether DSM-III, DSM-IIIR, or DSM-
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lepsy,142 and being HIV-positive. 43 Mental and emotional conditions
also have been held to be within the rubric of the 
ADA's protection.14
For instance, individuals with learning disabilities,14 depressive disor-
ders, 146 and anxiety and stress disorders 14 may be regarded as having
disabilities.
PTSD is one mental disability explicitly acknowledged in caselaw
as meriting protection under the ADA.14s The National Institute of
Mental Health has described PTSD as an "extremely disabling condi-
tion" that can occur "after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in
which grave physical harm occurred or was threatened.'
149 The ADA
recognizes the reality and the seriousness of PTSD, and it recognizes
that the condition can be created by environmental stressors. Courts
(holding that an individual had a disability since without medication he would be un-
able to perform major life activities).
142 See EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 425 (W.D. Va. 1996) (hold-
ing that an individual prone to tonic-clone seizures that temporarily rendered him un-
conscious had a disability), affd sub nom. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683
(4th Cir. 1996).
143 See D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995) (concluding that
plaintiff had a disability by virtue of HIV status and citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (l) (iii)).
144 See Lee v. Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that mental
health services and other activities undertaken by law enforcement are services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity within the meaning of the ADA); Applicants v.
Tex. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 165, 170 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(holding that persons who are not currently impaired, but who have a history of men-
tal illness or emotional disorder, may fit within the statutory definition of having a dis-
ability).
145 See Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 662 (E.D.
Mo. 1994) (holding that if an individual is diagnosed as having a learning disability,
she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA).
146 See Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that
depression by itself does not constitute a disability unless the person can show that in
her particular case, ajury could find that depression did constitute a disability).
See Groncki v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., No. 98-7263, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
22310, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1999) (deciding that a plaintiff suffering from PTSD was
a qualified individual with a disability and offered evidence sufficient to overcome de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment).
148 Id.; see also DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ENFORCING THE
ADA: A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE (Apr.-June 1997) ("A na-
tional licensing board [in the Western District of Michigan] agreed to make testing
accommodations for a student with PTSD, including placing the student in a separate
room, allowing extra time to complete the exam, and providing a break between each
portion of the exam."), http://www.usdoj.gov:80/crt/ada/apjun
9 7 .pdf.
149 NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, FACTS ABOUT POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/anxiety/ptsdfacts.cfm; see
also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL




current definition of PTSD and its "insistence on a major external threat
[that] is too restrictive because any stressor is potentially traumato-
genic," arguing that this results in significant underdiagnosing' of
PTSD.1
54
Some evidence suggests that the underdiagnosed population is
disproportionately represented by people of color: stress-inducing
situations suffered by whites as well as by people of color are included
under the ADA, 5 5 while similar conditions suffered more often by
people of color alone are not included. For instance, clinicians have
suggested that exposure to physical force and display 
of weapons,'56
151 
157witnessing abusive violence, suffering from substance abuse,
8 resid-
ing in socioeconomically depressed inner-city neighborhoods,
5
1' being
subjected to police misconduct,' ° and being homeless
"" may all be
IV provides an adequate description of the psychological consequences of more ordi-
nary stressors or the less severe reactions to extreme stressors." Glenn Craig Davis &
Naomi Breslau, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Victims of Civilian Trauma and Criminal
Violence, 17 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 289, 289 (1994). Others have noted that "be-
cause in the pathologic (stressful) reaction to a traumatic event, the boundary between
the mentally healthy and the mentally ill is obscured, the subject is difficult for clini-
cians to consider." Stephen M. Sonnenberg, Victims of Violence and Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, 11 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 581, 581 (1988).
' A Davis & Breslau, supra note 153, at 296. But See PETERSON ET AL., supra note
152, at 134 (noting a "tendency among some clinicians not to maintain strict adher-
ence to the criteria for PTSD as outlined in the DSM-IlI" because it is overinclusive).
155 The DSM-IV explicitly enumerates the events acknowledged to produce the
symptoms of PTSD. Military combat, violent personal assault, being taken hostage, ter-
rorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp,
natural or manmade disasters, auto accidents, or being. diagnosed with a life-
threatening illness are the events that are clinically recognized as rising to the level of
trauma needed to support a diagnosis of PTSD. DSM-IV, supra note 149, at 424. Each
of these are traumas to which whites as well as people of color have been exposed, as
compared to those to which people of color are disproportionately exposed. See infta
notes 156-75 (distinguishing between stressors to which whites and people of color are
generally exposed).
156 Davis & Breslau, supra note 153, at 297.
157 I. LISA MCCANN & LAURIE ANNE PEARLMAN, PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA AND THE
ADULT SURVIVOR: THEORY, THERAPY, AND TRANSFORMATION 110 (1990).
158 But see PETERSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 38 (stating that "[w]hereas sub-
stance abuse was considered possible in the DSM-III description of PTSD, the DSM-IIl-
R description indicates that psychoactive substance use disorders are common compli-
cations of the disorder," and were thus omitted from the list of diagnostic stressors).
159 See LAURENCE MILLER, SHOCKS TO THE SYSTEM: PSYCHOTHERAPY OF TRAUMATIC
DISABILITY SYNDROMES 160-61 (1998) (claiming that "residents of crime-ridden and
socioeconomically depressed inner-city neighborhoods" have exhibited "classic signs
and symptoms of PTSD").
160 See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (examining stressors that are
commonly associated with police misconduct).
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correlated with mental disabilities. In the United States, people of
color are, or have been, more frequently exposed to these types of en-
vironmental stressors, including military combat in the Vietnam
War,162 violent personal assault 33 (including sexual assault,' 64 physical
attack, robbery,16"5 and mugging), exposure to low-income neighbor-
hoods" 6 and public schools (which are often subject to higher inci-
dences of such crimes), and police misconduct.' 7 In addition to be-
ing disproportionately exposed to PTSD-inducing stressors, some
people of color may face challenges in their efforts to obtain treat-
ment" and in recovery 16 that are not faced by white individuals offi-
161 See I. Lyall et al., Incidence of Persons with a Learning Disability Detained in Police
Custody, 35 MED. SCI. & L. 61, 70 (1995) (noting that "epidemiological studies have
demonstrated that people with mild learning disabilities may live in deprived settings
and... psychiatric disorder[s] are increased compared to the general population").
162 Military combat is one of the enumerated PTSD-inducing stressors in the DSM-
IV. Supra note 149, at 424. The Vietnam War in particular has been recognized as an
especially pernicious source of PTSD symptoms. Researchers found:
Higher symptom levels in black subjects were accounted for by higher levels of
stressors during their war experience, with more intense combat experiences.
There was no requirement to postulate a racial sensitivity to PTSD. Rather,
this study suggested that black soldiers saw or perceived more stressful combat
exposure than white soldiers.
L. STEPHEN O'BRIEN, TRAUMATIc EVENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH 61-62 (1998). And
while discussion of the Vietnam War usually focuses on United States veterans, a sig-
nificant population of Vietnamese Americans now live in the United States, many of
whom were soldiers for the Viet Minh. Even those Vietnamese Americans who were
not soldiers were exposed to many of the same stressors as U.S. veterans were during
the war, and therefore they also may be at risk of suffering from PTSD.
163 People of color are disproportionately exposed to these stressors. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 220 (119th ed. 1999)
(documenting that in 1997, there were 49.0 victims of violent crime per 1000 persons
among blacks, 43.1 among Hispanics, and 38.3 among whites); MILLER, supra note 159,
at 160-61 (noting that, in one study, "almost half of th[e] sample of young inner-city
adults reported experiencing potentially traumatic events and about a quarter of them
developed full-blown PTSD").
164 See Wriggins, supra note 8, at 122 n.1 18 ("Recent data from random citizen in-
terviews suggest that Black women are much more likely to be victims of illegal rape
than are white women.").
165 COLE, supra note 6, at 5 ("African Americans are victimized by robbery at a rate
150 percent higher than whites.").
6b U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 163, at 220 (indicating that per 1000 persons,
those living in households with incomes of less than $7,000 had a crime index of 71,
households with an income of anywhere from $7,500 to $14,999 had an index of 51.2,
and households with an income greater than or equal to $75,000 had an index of
30.7).
167 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the relation-
ship between race and police brutality).
168 See SANDRA L. BROWN, COUNSELING VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 79 (1991) ("For in-
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cially diagnosed with PTSD.
Additionally, while incarceration in prisoner of war or concentra-
tion camps is considered traumatic, incarceration in penal institutions
is not. The latter condition applies to a disproportionate number of
people of color, while the former two categories are represented
mostly by whites. None of these stressors that disproportionately af-
fect people of color have been enumerated explicitly in the DSM-IVas
supporting a diagnosis of PTSD.1
70
Other stressors that are overlooked in the clinical list of stressors
are exposure to "hate crimes" 7' directed at people of color and per-
stance, ethnic groups face a number of problems in reporting abuse and obtaining
services. For some, their communication in English is so poor that they are unable to
make their needs known to authorities or counselors."). Lack of insurance may also
hamper access to recovery. Id. at 83. In addition, one clinician noted that "[a]'major
problem in beginning the counseling process with ethnic minority clients is that cul-
tural differences are still so confusing to them and they may not understand our pro-
grams, theories, or therapies. Likewise, counselors are often unaware of clients' cul-
tural family dynamics or strong sexist beliefs or roles." Id. at 81. Recognition of
cultural chasms between client and practitioner need not be couched in such patroniz-
ing terms, and arguably the more forceful portrait of this obstacle to adequate treat-
ment is provided by consideration of the overwhelming domination of the psychiatric
profession by white practitioners. Some doctors have done their best to emphasize
that
racism pervades and complicates the psychological issues experienced by
members of both the majority and minority cultures.... [A] racist society...
can lead to the development of disturbed schemas about trust and safety
which impede the growth of a therapeutic relationship, particularly between
client and therapist of different races. Therapists must be aware of their own
stereotypes about members of different racial groups in order to avoid re-
traumatizing clients ....
MCCANN & PEARLMAN, supra note 157, at 117. It is further noted that "[c]linicians
must understand something about the historical and cultural context [of the patient's
trauma] if they are going to work effectively with these populations and understand
the profound past and present impact of these events on the client's life." Id. at 114.
69 Even in the hands of culturally nuanced practitioners from different ethnic
groups, the recovery of people of color who suffer from PTSD or PTSD-related disor-
ders may be impeded: Although "PTSD bypasses cultural boundaries.... [studies] re-
veal that counseling the ethnically different client may be similar in terms of PTSD re-
actions but very different in terms of social systems support and other cultural aspects
that influence recovery." BROWN, supra note 168, at 79.
170 See DSM-IV, supra note 149, at 424 (listing stressors that lead to PTSD, but not
including these factors that are more likely to be experienced by people of color).
1 The term "hate crime" here refers to crimes directed at members of socially
subordinate groups that are motivated by the victims' membership in such groups.
Some commentators, however, prefer to use other terms. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, "Gay Rights"for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Dis-
course, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1358, 1374 n.81 (2000) ("Because terms such as 'hate
crimes' or 'bias crimes' distort the systematic, structural, and political dimensions of
acts of violence against members of socially subordinate groups, I refer to such crimes
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petual exposure to racial animus in general. For instance, while
Holocaust victims are explicitly recognized as likely candidates for
PTSD, victims of other hate crimes are not.' Similarly, violent per-
sonal assault of an indiscriminate nature is mentioned in the DSM, but
racially motivated attacks are not,73 despite indications that PTSD re-
actions may be similar. This further suggests that the clinical defini-
tion of PTSD is underinclusive, narrowly defined in a manner that is
disproportionately beneficial to whites.
7 5
The current interpretation of the ADA thus fosters an implication
that conduct associated with adverse reactions to police is innate to
people of color.'7 6 The reactions of victims of color to police are not
recognized as rational behavior, as manifestations of a normal psychi-
atric coping mechanism, or as behavior justified by being attributable
to a clinically recognized disability. Similar reactions induced by stres-
sors to which whites are exposed, meanwhile, are attributed to PTSD.
The reactions of whites are thereby neatly explained, while the reac-
tions of people of color hang precipitously unassociated with any such
legitimizing disability.
Dismissal of the experience of victims of color, by ignoring the ex-
ternal stressors to which they are more likely exposed, is particularly
as acts of 'oppressive violence."').
172 DSM-IV, supra note 149, at 424.
173 Id.
174 BROWN, supra note 168, at 79.
175 This is not to say that the enumerated and nonenumerated stressors are ex-
pected to produce identical symptoms. When PTSD has been studied in cross-cultural
contexts, researchers have pointed out that "it is known that traumatic reactions take
somewhat different forms or involve somewhat different patterns of thought in differ-
ent cultural groups." Sonnenberg, supra note 153, at 587. For instance, correlations
have been noted between "different varieties of potential trauma" and "the incidence
of PTSD in different social groups." Id. at 584. The point is that the trauma is similar
in degree, not in kind, among those exposed to stressors to which whites are more of-
ten subject and those exposed to stressors to which people of color are more often sub-
ject, and that the DSM's standard for diagnosis only recognizes the "white" kinds of
stressors.
176 While eugenics has been debunked forcefully enough in recent years to dis-
courage most clinicians from relying on it to advance the erroneous correlations it en-
genders, RichardJ. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's thoroughly discredited book, The
Bell Curve, stands as a testament that such efforts are not likely to cease anytime soon.
See RiCHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, T1-E BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 317-40 (1994) (arguing that there is a causal rela-
tion between intelligence and race). But see STEPHENJAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF
MAN 367-90 (1996) (specifically critiquing The Bell Curve). Furthermore, popular un-
derstanding of such a misinformed correlation may exacerbate already disdainful
stereotypes associated with people of color.
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inappropriate in the context of police misconduct. Some suggest that
stressors associated with police misconduct, such as sudden injury,
177
witnessing injury, 178 assault, 179 threat to life, narrow escape, motor
vehicle accidents, 8 2 physical force, 8 3 display of weapons, 184 and victim
injury do in fact exacerbate PTSD. Others note that police officers
incite behavior that can be, and often is, interpreted as symptomatic
of various maladies, including such "odd" behavior as flight.186 There





182 Id. at 292-93. Third parties are often injured by "hot-pursuit" police chases. See
Geoffrey P. Albert & Roger G. Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory
Elements, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 528 (1989) (noting that, for instance, a
1987 Metro-Dade Police Department study revealed that forty-five percent of pursuits
conducted in the county resulted in property damage, thirty-four percent in an acci-
dent, and twenty-three percent in personal injury); Derek W. Meinecke, Assessment of
Police Conduct During High-Speed Chases in State Tort Liability Cases: The Effects of Fiser v.
City of Ann Arbor and Rogers v. City of Detroit, 46 WAYNE L. REV 325, 328 (2000)
("[H]igh-speed police chases carry a significant likelihood of property damage and
serious personal injury."); Erik Savas, Hot Pursuit: When Police Pursuits Run over Constitu-
tional Lines, 1988 DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 858 & n.1 ("In the
United States today, police officers are increasingly involved in high-speed police
chases where the ultimate result is an assortment of consequences ranging from minor
property damage to loss of human life.").
183 Davis & Breslau, supra note 153, at 291 ("Certain characteristics of rape, such
as... use of physical force, display of weapons, and victim injury, were observed to be




186 The perspective that police bear a measure of responsibility even for criminal
behavior is prevalent. It has been observed:
[Y] ear after year, from the halls of academia, police desks and judges' cham-
bers, we are presented with tired causal explanations of the factors which al-
legedly underlie criminal behavior-poverty, under-employment, broken
homes, drugs, poor education, rising expectations, the age of anxiety, anomie,
malaise, personality, ethnicity, community instability, brain biochemistry and
so on. But these explanations never satisfy.... The case may be that these
explanations, while not completely irrelevant and untrue, while providing
some enlightenment and footing for the practical amelioration of crime and
criminality in the African American community, may be but manifestations of
a deeper, more profound set of variables.
AMOS N. WILSON, BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE: THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF BLACK SELF-
ANNIHILATION IN SERVICE OF WHITE DOMINATION 16 (1990). The author suggests that
police misconduct is a more appropriate causal factor and laments the fact that
"[c]ausal explanations which include the character, perspectives, and behavior of the
ruling group as a part of the problem, are designated 'radical' by establishment aca-
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is also evidence indicating that police are situated to prevent, arrest,S • 187
or remedy the antisocial behavior. Thus, it is possible to consider
police at least indirectly responsible for the persistence of such behav-
ior. 18
Ignoring the role of the police may have adverse consequences for
the plaintiffs health. In the context of spousal abuse, psychiatrists are
adamant about the obligation of the legal system to help the victim,
arguing that "[e]mphasis initially on the use of legal systems to stop
the abuse must almost be mandatory, because numerous studies show
that treatment is most successful when abusers are forced to admit to
themselves and others that they have, in fact, committed crimes.1 8 9
Similarly, a legal unwillingness to hold officers engaging in miscon-
duct accountable could negatively affect a victim's recovery. More
broadly, individual psychoses may be undiagnosed, masked by racial
stereotypes.
The dismissal of the stress-induced reactions of people of color
also has adverse legal consequences in police misconduct litigation.
Traumatic experiences suffered by whites as well as people of color
present the sufferer with the possibility of a diagnosis of PTSD and the
concomitant protection of the ADA. Many traumatic experiences suf-
fered primarily or exclusively by people of color, however, do not lead
to a diagnosis of PTSD.'9 0 Divorced from any identification with clini-
cal disorders, courts dismiss the stress-induced reactions of people of
color as simply "odd,"91 while the stress-induced reactions of whites
demicians and thereby rendered null and void." Id. at 15.
187 See Leah J. Dickstein, Spouse Abuse and Other Domestic Violence, 11 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 611, 618 (1988) (providing a parallel in spousal abuse cases, where it
has been noted that "law enforcement can stop abuse more readily and more perma-
nently then [sic] can conciliation, which includes mediation and therapy outside the
legal system" (citation omitted)). The notion that police are situated to prevent and
arrest antisocial behavior is reinforced by the fact that police officers are often the first
caregivers in lower socioeconomic groups. See John A. Talbott & Susan W. Talbott,
Training Police in Community Relations and Urban Problems, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 894,
894 (1971) (discussing the importance of training the police on mental health issues
because "policemen are frequently the first care givers involved with lower socioeco-
nomic groups").
188 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 (2000) (noting that "these concerns
and fears [regarding the belief among many people of color that it is prudent to avoid
police] are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforce-
ment investigations into their own practices" (footnotes omitted)).
189 Dickstein, supra note 187, at 626.
190 See supra notes 155-75 and accompanying text (discussing stressors to which
people of color are exposed, such as hate crime violence).
191 See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text (discussing a Second Circuit opin-
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may be legitimized and justified with a diagnosis of PTSD. The ADA is
therefore interpreted so as not to afford many people of color ade-
quate protection. Meanwhile, victims of color retain the stigma of ab-
normality that is often associated with disabilities.
IV. TWO RACE-CONSCIOUS PROPOSALS FOR FACILITATING SUCCESSFUL
POLICE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS BY PLAINTIFFS OF COLOR
A. Distinguishing the Effects of Racism on the Individual Psyche from the
Societal Effects of Racism: Two Proposals
People of color thus appear to be in a double bind when faced
with the prospect of bringing a cause of action against police officers.
Section 1983 is intended to benefit people of color, but is technically
impotent, and the ADA, while technically viable beyond § 1983, simply
is not tailored to serve adequately people of color. Racism plays a role
in this disparity.
To approach this problem, one must bear in mind the distinction
between conceiving of racism as an atomistic phenomenon, and ra-
cism as a pervasive, societal phenomenon.192 The prevailing color-
blind approach to law maintains that racism in this country is of an
atomistic nature, and that instances of racism are deviations from the
norm. 9 3 Critical Race Theory, by contrast, recognizes that racism is
pervasive, and exists as more than the sum of isolated racist occur-194
rences. It contends that racism can inhere in a society's organiza-
tional fiber even when no individual racist aggressor is identified as
ion indicating that an officer's claim that a person's behavior was "odd" satisfies the
requirement of reasonable suspicion, even if the officer's precinct is publicly regarded
as being infamous for its corrupt police).
192 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J.
1, 2-3 (1995) (identifying this distinction in discussing the Supreme Court's treatment
of racial inequality in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
193 See id. ("(T]he Court... treat[ed] racial inequality... as a problem that has
become atomistic rather than pervasive in nature."); supra notes 5-7 and accompanying
text (discussing the unjust consequences of the colorblind approach); supra note 9
(discussing white Americans' reticence to acknowledge pervasive racism and the Su-
preme Court's decision to adhere to that view with respect to police misconduct). In
the context of police misconduct "[I]iberals tend to argue for more rights-protective
rules, while conservatives tend to advocate rules that give law enforcement more lee-
way. But both sides agree, at least in principle, that the line should be drawn in the
same place for everyone." COLE, supra note 6, at 7; see also id. at 5 (contending that
"our criminal justice system affirmatively depends on inequality").
194 For example, Cole notes that "[t]he disproportionate numbers of young black
men in prison and jail.., cannot be explained by discriminatory policing or prosecut-
ing alone." COLE, supra note 6, at 22.
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actively engaging in discrimination or inciting hate. In the context of
police misconduct, when racially discriminatory police practices are,
or would be, permitted by judicial interpretation of a society's laws,
Critical Race Theory suggests that pervasive racism exists even if such
practices are not applied, or no person of color is directly victimized
by such practices. 19 The passive toleration of such a legal structure
itself belies a racist society. If police officers do not accommodate the
reactions they elicit in some people of color when those reactions are
astutely learned survival mechanisms in response to societal racism,
the officers are dismissing the very real experience of racism. By ig-
noring the effects of pervasive racism, colorblind statutory interpreta-
tions endanger suspects of color.
Just as manifestations of racism can be characterized in atomistic
or pervasive terms, so can responses to racism.' + Consequently, since
the colorblind approach to the law only acknowledges atomistic mani-
festations of racism, it will only consider responses to isolated in-
stances of racism to be legitimate. For instance, if a plaintiff develops
a stress disorder as a result of a racial assault, that will be considered of
legitimate concern. (Even then, the plaintiff's claim will only be con-
sidered legitimate because assaults are recognized as stressful, not be-
cause racism is regarded as stressful." The element of racism is still
overlooked.) If, however, an individual develops a stress disorder in
response to daily pervasive manifestations of racism (such as not usu-
ally being able to catch a cab to get to work on time on account of be-
ing black), the law will not act to make the complainant whole again
because the law does not recognize the complained-of pervasive ra-
cism.
As such, the problem of police misconduct as it applies to people
of color is largely handled by looking the other way. Thus, even ac-
195 The Supreme Court has riled, for instance, that when an unconstitutional po-
lice policy exists, there is no municipal liability if the policy was not the "moving force"
behind, and was not "affirmative[ly] link[ed] to," the violation of the plaintiff's rights.
Supra note 109 and accompanying text. So even when the plaintiff is victimized di-
rectly, the municipality's unconstitutional practices are not checked.
Some have phrased this distinction in terms of the racist's psyche, rather than
the target of racism's psyche: "We must distinguish between individual psychological
reasons for the development of anti-black feelings and a pervasive climate of prejudice
which stimulates and evokes the potential of race prejudice in everyone." GRIER &
COBBS, supra note 21, at 184.
197 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (noting that violent assault is
recognized as a PTSD-inducing stressor by the DSM-IV, while racially motivated attacks
are not).
198 See supra notes 7, 9 (discussing a tendency on the part of some whites to ignore
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knowledging that the problem exists is a giant step forward. As legal
and scientific disciplines become more familiar with each other, how-
ever, it is difficult to know where to look to identify the ambiguities
that perpetuate inequity. An analysis of the ADA offers unique insight
into the logic behind the courts' treatment of claims of misconduct
and how it affects people of color.""
First, it exposes a contradiction in statutory rationale. In its effort
to eliminate one form of discrimination (based on disability) by ad-
hering to clinical definitions of PTSD, it tolerates another form of dis-
crimination (based on race). Second, it illustrates how Congress's
stated purpose of eliminating discrimination against people with dis-
abilities and people of color is undermined. Looking at how much
help judges have allowed Congress to provide plaintiffs under the
ADA demonstrates that courts can facilitate successful suits if they
need to do so. It underscores how little help plaintiffs of color have
received in comparison to other groups of plaintiffs, even though
plaintiffs of color may experience a similar degree of discrimination.
Finally, as this portion of the Comment will argue, analyzing the
treatment of PTSD in particular under the ADA illustrates how futile
and unduly complicated it is to find what amounts to a proxy (such as
PTSD) for the stresses of racism to address the impact race has on po-
lice interactions.
This comparison of the ADA to § 1983 ultimately provides impetus
for proposals to enact race-conscious legislation that obliges judges to
explicitly recognize that race directly and fundamentally affects the
nature of police interactions. This portion of the Comment will sub-
mit and consider two proposals for facilitating remedies for police
misconduct victims of color.
the occurrence of racism).
199 Sociologist Leslie Miller notes that "[p]ower is exercised ... in sites where...
struggles have been silenced." Leslie J. Miller, Claims-Making from the Underside: Margi-
nalization and Social Problems Analysis, in CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSIES: ISSUES IN
SOCIAL PROBLEMS THEORY 153, 167 (Gale Miller & James A. Holstein eds., 1993). She
warns that it is incorrect to assume "that members of subordinate groups will every-
where and always" adopt a certain strategy of voicing themselves. Id. at 173. In light of
such comments, it should, of course, be recognized that many people of color may find
it undesirable to compare their reactions to disabilities or PTSD at all, even for the
sake of concluding that such reactions are fundamentally distinct from any such dis-
ability. There is no reason to assume that some people of color have not already con-
sidered addressing the ADA's treatment of police-induced stressors and declined the
proposition. Miller's caveat that exclusion from a dominant discourse may represent
an act of resistance rather than a reflection of the status quo indeed may apply in the
circumstances surrounding PTSD and police misconduct.
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The first proposal is intended to acknowledge the effects of racism
on the traumatized individual victim of color's psyche by expanding
the ADA's substantive benefits. Specifically, it would revise the clinical
definition of PTSD to include a broader range of stressors, such as rac-
ist encounters, so that the ADA would include victims of racial dis-
crimination-based trauma within its purview.
The second proposal is designed to acknowledge the effects of ra-
cism on people of color at the societal level (whether they display
symptoms of stress disorders or not) by exporting the ADA's proce-
dural benefits. In other words, Proposal Two solicits a new statute that
shifts the emphasis away from legitimizing the plaintiffs' reactions,
and toward admonishing the misconduct of the defendant police, ex-
plicitly providing the blanket forms of statutory relief available under
the ADA °00 to police misconduct victims of color.
The distinctions between atomistic and pervasive conceptions of
racism, and between individual and societal responses to racism, are
integral to assessing the two proposals submitted above. Proposal One
would facilitate plaintiffs' claims, even when those claims must be
couched in atomistic terms in keeping with the present statutory re-
gime, by arguing for a clinical acknowledgement of how racism affects
the individual psyche. Proposal Two, however, argues that the atomistic
understanding of racism should be abandoned in recognition of ra-
cism's pervasive nature. Proposal Two, therefore, facilitates plaintiffs'
claims by acknowledging how racism affects them societally. The ADA
informs both proposals, and reflects the need for race-conscious ap-
proaches to police misconduct in both proposals, but in ways that
must be recognized as distinct.
B. Proposal One: Substantive Expansion of the ADA to Acknowledge the
Impact of Racism on the Individual Psyche
1. Acknowledging the Impact of Racism as a Psychological Stressor
Embracing an interdependency of law and psychology, courts in-
creasingly have relied upon the professional opinions of psychiatrists
201to address legal issues involving mental disorders (often referring to
200 See supra Part II.B (discussing the procedural advantages that make blanket
forms of statutory relief available under the ADA).
201 Addressing the American Psychiatric Association at his Guttmacher award lec-
ture in 1988, law professor Daniel W. Shuman argued that the profession of psychiatry
bears an obligation to aid the courts in assessing accurately the various symptoms of
PTSD. He emphasized that a failure to make the features of PTSD clear to the courts
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the DSM specifically) ,22 and to provide guidance as to what constitutes
203the forms and symptoms of particular mental illnesses. However,
the reliance that courts place on psychiatric expertise in many in-
stances is unduly exaggerated, if not unfounded, because it is based
on an inflated notion of scientific objectivity, which in turn is rooted
in a belief that scientists are capable of distilling the relevant complex
204
causal interactions to unassailably objective facts. As with other sci-
not only may damage the credibility of the field of psychiatry, but also may entail a loss
of accuracy in the judicial system. See Ralph Slovenko, Legal Aspects of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, 17 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 439, 445 (1994) (paraphrasing Shuman's
assertion that if "child sexual abuse syndrome" is not demonstrated to give rise to
commonly known or "commonly understood" symptoms, the psychiatric profession
must clarify this for the courts (citing David M. Shuman, The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders in the Courts, BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., 1989, at
25)).
202 See supra note 151 (providing examples of such cases). It has been noted that
while a "psychiatric diagnostic category is not essential to a cause of action,... the list-
ing of stress reactions in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM has tended to
give the claim more legitimacy," so that trauma victims increasingly have used that
formulation of PTSD in lawsuits. Slovenko, supra note 201, at 441. These remarks un-
derscore courts' unwillingness to assess independently any PTSD-related clinical data
that is not processed through the filter of psychiatric opinion.
203 See I.C.H. Clare & G.H. Gudjonsson, Interrogative Suggestibility, Confabulation, and
Acquiescence in People with Mild Learning Disabilities (Mental Handicap): Implications for
Reliability During Police Interrogations, 32 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 295, 295 (1993)
(noting that "[i]n the last decade, psychologists have been asked, with increasing fre-
quency, to prepare reports for the court" that are of a clinical nature).
Challenges to the concept of objective fact achieved through analyses of how
knowledge is constructed have deep philosophical roots. Several Continental Euro-
pean schools of thought, ranging from Heidegger and the hermeneuticists to the
French postmodernists (e.g., Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Guattari), to the Frankfurt
School (e.g., Habermas, Horkheimer, and Adorno) are often accredited with influenc-
ing these challenges. American scholars such as Dewey and Kuhn also offered similar
analyses. The Frankfurt School in particular has set the stage for the work of many of
the scholars mentioned above. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 5
(John Viertel trans., 1973) (examining the consequences of "the circumstance that sci-
ence increasingly plays the role of a primary force of production"); MAX HORKHEIMER
& THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT, at xi (John Cummin trans.,
1972) (arguing that "[i]f the assiduous maintenance and verification of the scientific
heritage are an essential part of knowledge... not only the pursuit but the meaning of
science has become problematical"). While the above philosophers are commonly
recognized as influencing studies of scientific thought, the conclusions many of them
reach have been addressed by, and derive significant if unheralded influence from,
nonwhite and non-Western scholarship and philosophies. See generally, e.g., THE
"RACIAL" ECONOMY OF SCIENCE: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE (Sandra Harding
ed., 1993) (discussing sciences of China, Africa, and South America, and reevaluating
the assumptions of Western science); SCIENCE, HEGEMONYAND VIOLENCE: A REQUIEM
FOR MODERNITY (Ashis Nandy ed., 1996) (criticizing the notion that a scientific ap-
proach is always superior to other forms of inquiry and assessing the impact of that ap-
proach).
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201entific disciplines, the clinical conclusions of psychiatry are as much
the product of value-laden cultural and social factors as they are of ob-
jective observation.2 0 ' Far from being an impartial provider of objec-
tive clinical data (as evidenced by the discussion in Part 111), the psy-
chiatric profession is also prone to include potentially legally relevant
assumptions and value judgments in its very definition of PTSD.2 °7
This may result in clinicians depriving people of color (irrespective of
whether it is done intentionally or not) of the benefits of legal remedy
by constructing what still may be an underinclusive definition of
PTSD.
When assessing a cause of action, courts are empowered to iden-
tify such subjective value judgments in the facts presented to them.
But often the courts are equally, if not more, willing to engage in simi-
lar value judgments. The same type of criticisms that expose scien-
205 Even clinical or laboratory results obtained in the "hard" sciences like biology
long have been recognized to be subject to the idiosyncrasies of the individuals con-
ducting the research. In their landmark study of a bioassay laboratory, for instance
sociologists Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar examine how facts are constructed, not-
ing that "the epistemological qualities of validity or wrongness cannot be separated
from sociological notions of decisionmaking." BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR,
LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 121 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1986) (1979). In short, statements understood as scientific "facts," like the diag-
noses of PTSD, are malleable and context sensitive. Deciding whether to label reac-
tions to police as being evidence of PTSD requires an analysis of the cultural processes
at work in defining PTSD in the first place.
206 The speciousness of the conception of psychiatry as being a science capable of
isolating objective scientific truths is highlighted by the fact that clinicians themselves
disagree about how to define psychiatric phenomena. See supra notes 152-54 and ac-
companying text (describing progressive clinicians' criticisms of the current definition
of PTSD as being too narrow). Even a cursory look at the definitions of PTSD offered
by clinicians testifies to the potential for infusing value judgments in psychiatric diag-
noses and the definitions' relatively ambiguous nature. The definition of PTSD evolves
with a rather rapid rate of transformation, lending credence to the notion that there is
no one correct and indisputable definition of PTSD. See infra note 214 (describing the
discrepancies between the definitions of PTSD given in the DSM-111 and DSM-IV). Any
given scientific "fact"-including any definition of a stress disorder-therefore must be
considered in light of the social environment in which it was created. Sociologists note
that "[e]ven a well-established fact loses its meaning when divorced from its context,"
and "can take on a different meaning and significance depending on the particular
network of individuals for which it has relevance," varying according to its usage.
LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 205, at 110. When the social environment tolerates
discriminatory police misconduct, even the rigor of the relevant science must be exam-
ined for taint.
207 Latour and Woolgar suggest that attempts at persuasion affect how scientific
facts are constructed. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 205, at 81. Scientists, like
judges, are aware of this critique, and they take pains to erase any indication of subjec-
tivity or persuasiveness that could tarnish any claims to impartial, objective fact produc-
tion. Id. at 76.
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tists' utter lack of objectivity, despite claims to the contrary, are levied
convincingly against judges as well .0  Professor Paul Butler, for in-
stance, reports that "[w]hen judges 'decide' cases, they 'choose' legal
principles to determine particular outcomes., 209  Similarly, judges
"choose" when to apply clinical definitions.
Jody D. Armour's discussion of the Florida case of Jandrucko v.
Colorcraft/Fuqua Corp.,210 illustrates this point. In Jandrucko, a fifty-nine-
year-old white woman successfully filed a workers' compensation claim
indicating that she had developed a form of PTSD that caused physi-
cal and psychological reactions to blacks-particularly "big, black
males"-after being mugged by a black male while on the job as a cus-
tomer service employee. The court accepted that her fear of "big,
black males" rendered her incapable of finding gainful employment
and awarded the plaintiff total disability benefits for her phobia.i
The presiding judge commented that the plaintiffs pathological fear
of blacks was not an exercise of "'private racial prejudice,"' but rather
was a "work-related phobia.",1
Thus, by the time the effect of race and racism on a plaintiffs per-
sonal psychology is ruled on, it has been filtered through two poten-
tially biased screens-that of clinicians, and that of the judge. This
has direct consequences for the efficacy of ADA claims that rely on
purportedly objective definitions of stress disorders. Basing the viabil-
ity of a claim on the definition of the plaintiff as a prototypical victim
208 Critical Legal Studies theorists, and later Critical Race theorists, have long ar-
gued that judicial decisions, despite their claim to objectivity, are value laden. See gen-
erally THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641-717 (David Kairys ed., 3d
ed. 1998) (providing discussions on this theme).
2VJ Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 707 (1995). Butler adds, "even if neutrality were possible, it
would not be desirable, because no general principle of law can lead to justice in every
case." Id. It is similarly unlikely that a general definition of what constitutes erratic
social or psychological behavior will always ensure that the definition will be applied in
a just manner. If people of color who are in fact suffering from a stress disorder can-
not count on receiving a proper diagnosis, or if their particular circumstances are not
addressed, they may be hampered in their efforts to determine which would be the
most appropriate medical or social support systems to approach in order to expedite
their recovery. The legal system itself should be one such social support system at the
service of people of color faced with questionable diagnoses. The lack of such support
may directly impede recovery.
210 No. 163-20-6245 (Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., Apr. 26, 1990).
211 Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 800 (1994).
212 William Booth, Phobia About Blacks Brings Workers' Compensation Award, WASH.
POST, Aug. 13, 1992, at A3 (quoting the workers' compensation judge,John C. Tomli-
son,Jr. who awarded the plaintiff disability).
2002] 1625
1626 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1585
gives those who define the prototype, whether psychiatrist or judge, a
gatekeeping power to prevent certain groups of people from having
remedies available to them.
This is especially problematic when mental disabilities are at issue
in the context of police misconduct because there is evidence that
clinical dispositions toward those disabilities are influenced directly by
the police.1 3 If the police engage in discriminatory misconduct, their
influence on clinical assessments of patients of color will be similarly
biased.
One strategy for establishing a more equitable distribution ofjus-
tice, therefore, would be to argue for a race-conscious revision of the
interpretation of stress disorders like PTSD under the ADA -one that
would acknowledge the seriousness of racist stressors. Indeed, the
definition of PTSD used by the courts is not the only definition avail-
able, nor is it necessarily the best or most accurate definition'14 -par-
ticularly in light of evidence that people of color are underdiagnosed
with PTSD.21 3 Some clinicians have, in fact, already hinted that it
216would be desirable to expand the definition of PTSD. Explicitly
acknowledging the effects racism may have on an individual's psy-
213 See Mary L. Durham et al., Police Involvement and Influence in Involuntay Civil
Commitment, 35 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 580, 580 (1984) (concluding from empiri-
cal study that police exercise undue influence over clinical decisions to admit patients
to psychiatric institutions). But see Margaret A. Watson et al., Police Referral to Psychiatric
Emergency Services and Its Effect on Disposition Decisions, 44 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY
1085, 1085 (1993) (arguing that police in their study did not exercise undue influence
on clinical admission decisions).
214 According to the DSM-IIIR, published in 1987, "The essential feature of this
disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically dis-
tressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e., outside the
range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business
losses, and marital conflict)." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-11IR]. Seven
years later, the DSM-IV altered the definition of PTSD. See supra note 150 (quoting the
DSM-IV definition of PTSD). Both definitions grant ample leeway for value-laden in-
terpretations. What "is outside the range of usual human experience" depends on
which humans and which experiences are being considered. The later definition pro-
vided in the DSM-IV, although more elaborate, is equally subjective, referring to "char-
acteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor." Both defini-
tions are struggling to put forth criteria whereby what is "normal" can be diagnostically
distinguished from what is "abnormal" or anomalous. What makes these distinctions
problematic is not their very existence: Rather, it is the notion that such distinctions
are impartial, objective, and factually unassailable, and therefore "correct," that is mis-
leading.
B See supra notes 155-75 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that people
of color are underdiagnosed with PTSD).
216 See supra notes 153-54 (examining various criticisms of the definition of PTSD).
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che-for example, by adjusting the definition of PTSD-would ex-
pand the domain of viable causes of action in police misconduct liti-
gation under the ADA for some people of color.217
Proposal One would facilitate claims for people of color under the
ADA in a manifestly race-conscious manner by acknowledging that not
only is police misconduct a stressor, but so is the racial discrimination
that often accompanies it. In that respect, an expansion and direct
application of the ADA is appropriate. The rationale underlying the
ADA is that it protects and legitimizes anomalous behavior. As dis-
cussed in Part III, disabilities generally are viewed as atypical charac-
teristics shared only by "a discrete and insular minority., 218 Judges may
legitimize atypical plaintiff conduct under the ADA by attributing it to
that individual's disability.219 This is an appropriate rationale for help-
ing persons with stress disorders who happen to be people of color. It
may even be appropriate for helping people of color who develop dis-
orders in response to racist stressors that are anomalous even among
2201people of color.
2. Why a Substantive Expansion of the ADA Is Not Enough
While direct substantive application of the ADA may be appropri-
ate for addressing how racism may traumatize a given individual psy-
che, however, the rationale of the ADA is not appropriate for address-
ing societal racism. Even if the ADA is expanded substantively such
that racist stressors are acknowledged as being precipitating causes of
diagnosable stress disorders, such a proposal still does nothing to help
people of color who are subject to the same racist stressors even
though they have not developed stress disorders in response.
As discussed above, there is evidence that racist externalities can
221
develop or intensify mental illnesses in a given individual's psyche.
217 One serious caveat of such a proposal is that it may result in patients being di-
agnosed against their will, which can subject unwilling patients to medication and con-
finement. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 168-73 (1981) (noting that when patients are deemed "ill,"
they may receive nonconsensual treatment when such treatment would not be other-
wisepermitted).
Supra text accompanying note 128.
219 See supra notes 15, 126, 136, and accompanying text (discussing one such ex-
ample).
220 See infra note 237 (suggesting that relativizing a person's psychology by compar-
ing it to the norm within that person's race may be an appropriate means of identify-
ing who is a proper subject for therapy).
221 See supra notes 155-75 and accompanying text (indicating that stressors to
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Distinct from the effect of racism on the individual psyche is the exis-
tence of stressors associated with racism that permeate society as a
whole, and which affect all people of color-not just those persons
who develop mental illnesses as a response. The potential effects of
racism on the individual and the effects of racism on society at large
must not be conflated. It is a logical fallacy to conclude that since
persons who develop mental illnesses in response to racism are people
of color, only people of color who suffer from mental illnesses (or
otherwise act abnormally) experience racism-and that everyone else
is just overly sensitive.
Current statutory interpretations, however, encourage precisely
this error of conflating individual with societal responses to racist po-
lice misconduct. The courts' acknowledgement of the ADA as a le-
gitimate tool for police misconduct plaintiffs, while rendering most
§ 1983 claims ineffectual,223 suggests that certain prototypes exist that
are more likely to be regarded as representative of legitimate police
misconduct victims than others. Persons with physical or mental dis-
abilities are models of the "type" of person who may legitimately claim
victimhood in the face of the police. People of color, however, are
less likely to be viewed as legitimate claimants of police misconduct.
As a result, an implicit motivation exists for plaintiffs' attorneys to pi-
geonhole clients who wish to sue police as being disabled, with little or
no emphasis placed on any pertinent stressors associated with racial
discrimination. Facilitating effective claims against racist police by
people of color only when the plaintiff displays a mental illness-even
if the definition of mental illness is expanded to acknowledge racial
stressors, as per Proposal One-implicitly leads to the bizarrely inap-
propriate conclusion that unless a person of color is mentally ill, she
has not experienced actionable misconduct.
By presenting the plaintiff with the option of either portraying
which people of color are disproportionately exposed and explicitly racist stressors
such as racially motivated personal attacks may exacerbate PTSD).
222 Nonetheless, such interpretations are prevalent. Even psychologists note that
"[w]hite Americans have developed a high skill in the art of misunderstanding black
people." GRIER & COBBS, supra note 21, at 210. "Whites often argue that Blacks are
simply too sensitive or that the argued instance of discrimination is 'all in their head."'
Broman et al., supra note 8, at 178. Similarities in patterns of response to inquiries
about whether people of color felt racism in a given year indicated that "it is extremely
unlikely that fabricated, exaggerated, or random reports of racism from two different
samples would yield such similar results in the reported frequencies of the specific rac-
ist acts." Klonoff & Landrine, supra note 8, at 242.
223 See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (dismissing judicial treatment of
§ 1983).
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herself as mentally ill, or pursuing a § 1983 claim that is unlikely to
succeed, the present statutory regime in effect pressures the plaintiff
to apply the rationale of the ADA to claims for which it is not appro-
priate. It is not appropriate because the ADA, in effect, may legitimize
atypical plaintiff conduct by attributing it to that individual's disabil-
ity.224 The ADA thus obliges the judge to ask whether an officer
should have known that someone with a disability similar to the plain-
tiff's would react as the plaintiff did, and to legitimize formally the
plaintiffs reaction to the police in some cases. The implied rationale
behind the ADA is thus to protect the atypical reactions of those
whom Congress has determined "as a group, occupy an inferior status
in our society."22' But, as discussed in Part III, the plaintiffs reaction
itself-though legitimized-is still considered anomalous, or abnor-
mal.
The crucial point is that the adverse reactions of many people of
color should not even reach the stage of being legitimized (as the re-
actions of those considered to be persons with disabilities under the
ADA are), because their reactions are not abnormal in the first place. At
present, in the 'context of police misconduct, reasonable reactions to
the police are equated with typical reactions, and "'blame is reserved
for the (statistically) deviant."'226 Problems arise when typical behavior
is conceived of as being synonymous with reasonable behavior.27 The
224 See supra notes 15, 126 and accompanying text (describing how courts legiti-
mize conduct under the ADA).
25 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 128-31
(discussing Congress's reasons for creating the ADA).
226 I borrow this phrase from Armour, supra note 211, at 787 (quoting Mark Kel-
man, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 798, 801 (1991)).
227Jody D. Armour makes this point in her discussion of the "Reasonable Racist,"
who believes that he should be excused for considering a victim's race before using
force on the victim because the majority of similarly situated people also would have
done so. "For even if the 'typical' American believes that blacks' 'propensity' toward
violence justifies a quicker and more forceful response when a suspected assailant is
black," writes Armour, "this fact is legally significant only if the law defines reasonable
beliefs as typical beliefs. The reasonableness inquiry, however, extends beyond typical-
ity to consider the social interests implicated in a given situation. Hence not all 'typi-
cal' beliefs are per se reasonable." Armour, supra note 211, at 788 (emphasis added).
She further explains her distinction:
Typical beliefs may be considered reasonable for two very different reasons.
First, they are presumed to be accurate.... Accordingly, typical beliefs about
the propensity of blacks towards violence are reasonable insofar as we have no
reason to doubt them....
Second, typical beliefs may be considered reasonable on the supposition
that they are not blameworthy, however inaccurate or even irrational they may
be. This is the claim of reasonableness invoked by... the Reasonable Rac-
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reactions of people of color to traumatic stressors such as police mis-
conduct may be atypical only from the perspective of the white major-
ity. Those reactions, however, are not unreasonable by virtue of
their atypicality as judged by their deviation from a white norm. In-
deed, from the perspective of many other people of color (and per-
haps some whites), adverse reactions to the police are not even prop-
erly characterizable as atypical, but rather are rational responses to
stressful situations.
Many in the legal community acknowledge the effects of societal
racism. Law professor Paul Butler has noted that he "sympathize[s]
with people who react 'negatively' to the countless manifestations of
white supremacy that black people experience daily.... The antisocial
conduct is no more evil than the conditions that cause it ....
Speaking in terms of criminal conduct in particular, he argues that
such conduct "among African-Americans is often a predictable reac-
tion to oppression. Sometimes black crime is a symptom of internal-
ized white supremacy; other times it is a reasonable response to the
racial and economic subordination every African-American faces every
day."230 He adds that "[p] unishing black people for the fruits of ra-
cism is wrong if that punishment is premised on the idea that it is the
black criminal's 'just desserts.'
231
There is a large body of psychological and psychiatric literature
supporting this viewpoint, documenting the existence of societal ra-
232cism and its psychological effects on people of color. One commen-
ist .... According to this claim, even admittedly wrong judgments about a fact
or situation should be excused so long as most people would have reached the
same wrong conclusions under similar circumstances. This argument rests on
the premise that "we are blamed only for those actions and errors in judgment
that others would have avoided."
Id. (citation omitted).
228 See supra note 9 (citing one authority characterizing the Supreme Court major-
ity's opinion to be that "we all have the same set of experiences vis-a-vis the police");
infra note 277 (citing one authority arguing that the Supreme Court's involvement in
allocating resources boosts the interests of the white majority); see also, e.g., Jean John-
son, Americans' Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: Survey Findings, NAT'L INST. JUST. J.,
Sept. 1997, at 9, 13 (reporting a study by the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies which found that forty-three percent of African Americans consider police
misconduct toward African Americans to be a serious problem in their own communi-
ties).
229 Butler, supra note 209, at 716.
230 Id. at 680.
231 Id.
See, e.g., Klonoff & Landrine, supra note 8, at 234 (finding that ninety-six per-
cent of blacks experienced racism within one year's time, and that experiencing racism
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tator approaching the dilemma from a psychoanalytical perspective
poses the question: "What better way to 'provoke deadly but neces-
sary' violence against the African American community than first to
criminalize that community and then execute it for its alleged crimi-
nality? 2 33 Another legal commentator echoed this concern, noting
further:
Those who live in high crime areas will likely be poor and members of
minority groups, and these very same people may also have strong rea-
sons to avoid the police, given their past experiences. Thus, if the law al-
lows stops based on membership in just these two categories, it effec-
tively allows police nearly complete discretion to stop African Americans
who live in crime-prone urban neighborhoods.
Not only are many responses to racism characterized by employ-
ing the double negative "not unreasonable"-they are often patently,
affirmatively rational. Among the more famous psychoanalyses of so-
cietal racism is the work of William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, who
note that "[f]or a black man survival in America depends in large
measure on the development of a 'healthy' cultural paranoia."235 They
suggest that even if people of color actually violate the law (instead of
simply being innocent targets of racial profiling by police), their be-
havior is still reasonable:
[The black man in America] can never quite respect laws which have no
respect for him, and laws designed to protect white men are viewed as
white men's laws. To break another man's law may be inconvenient if
one is caught and punished, but it can never have the moral conse-
quences involved in breaking one's own law. The result may be de-
scribed as a cultural antisocialism, but it is simply an accurate reading of
was strongly related to total psychiatric symptoms); Hope Landrine & Elizabeth A.
Klonoff, The Schedule of Racist Events: A Measure of Racial Discrimination and a Study of Its
Negative Physical and Mental Health Consequences, 22 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 144 (1996) (ex-
ploring evidence in support of the notion that racial discrimination is relatively com-
mon and serves as a culturally specific stressor for blacks in America); Vonnie C.
McLoyd, Conceptual and Methodological Issues in the Study of Ethnic Minority Children and
Adolescents, in CHILDREN OF COLOR: RESEARCH, HEALTH, AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (Fitz-
gerald et al. eds., 1999) (finding that children of color may have more behavior and
emotional problems than their majority counterparts); see also supra note 8 (discussing
societal racism as manifest by police misconduct).
233 WILSON, supra note 186, at 52.
234 David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 1000
(1998).
235 GRIER& COBBS, supra note 21, at 161.
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one's environment-a gift black people have developed to a high de-




They emphasize that antisocial responses to a racist environment
must not be understood as evidence of psychoses, but as reasonable
reactions. "These and related traits are simply adaptive devices devel-
oped in response to a peculiar environment. They are no more
pathological than the compulsive manner in which a diver checks his
equipment before a dive or a pilot his parachute. 237
Federal court opinions (and dissenting opinions of the Supreme
Court) recognize that it is not unreasonable for people of color to be
suspicious of, and to react defensively to, the police. Justice Stevens,
writing for the dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow, noted that for minority
citizens living in high crime areas in particular, aversion to, or even
outright flight from, police officers "is neither 'aberrant' nor 'abnor-
mal'..... . Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of
these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and
too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.
2 38
The Wardlow dissent, addressing the defendant's flight at the sight
of police officers, recognized that
[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is
entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact
with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity
associated with the officer's sudden presence.'239
District courts also have questioned the abnormality of adverse re-
actions to police based on race. In 1996, Judge Harold Baer, presid-
ing in the Southern District of New York, issued a ruling in which he
suppressed the admission of evidence under the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine, which requires a judge to suppress any evidence
seized by virtue of a stop that violates a defendant's constitutional
236 Id. at 178.
237 Id. "It is a normal complement of psychological devices," they add, "and to find
the amount of sickness a black man has, one must first total all that appears to repre-
sent illness and then subtract the Black Norm. What remains is illness and a proper
subject for therapeutic endeavor." Id. at 179.
238 528 U.S. 119, 133-34 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The fact that this opinion was voiced in dissent does not detract from its validity,
but rather illustrates the need for a statutory means of imbuing this acknowledgment
with legal bite.
239 Id. at 132.
PROTECTION FROM PROTECTION
rights. 24° The defendant, a middle-aged black woman, was arrested at
5:00 a.m. after she pulled away from four males who had placed duffel
bags in the trunk of the car she was driving. The issue was whether
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated-whether
she was arrested without reasonable suspicion. 2 1  The judge stated,
240 See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("If the initial
stop of defendant's vehicle violated defendant's Constitutional rights, any subsequent
search or evidence seized by virtue of the violative stop will be suppressed under the
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine." (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
484-85 (1963))).
241 See Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 237 ("The inquiry here is whether the evidence
seized and the statements given were the fruits of a search and seizure made in viola-
tion of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights."). Judge Baer noted at the outset:
"I find [defendant's] statement to be credible and reject the testimony proffered by
[the arresting] Officer Carroll," id. at 234, thus discrediting the officer's claim that at
least one of the males ran from the scene upon becoming aware of the police officers'
presence, id. at 241. The judge added that the defendant's "candor and the breadth
and nature of her statements give her statement great credibility." Id. at 236. "The
testimony offered by Officer Carroll about how the events.., unfolded when juxta-
posed with the defendant's full fledged videotaped confession suggest that Officer
Carroll's testimony is at best suspect." Id. at 239.
Judge Baer continued:
Moreover, even assuming that one or more of the males ran from the corner
once they were aware of the officers' presence, it is hard to characterize this as
evasive conduct. Police officers, even those travelling in unmarked cars, are
easily recognized, particularly, in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same
United States Attorney's Office which brought this prosecution enjoyed more
success in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer of an anti-crime unit
operating in this very neighborhood. Even before this prosecution and the
public hearing... residents in this neighborhood tended to regard police of-
ficers as corrupt, abusive and violent. After the attendant publicity surround-
ing the ... events, had the men not run when the cops began to stare at them,
it would have been unusual.
Id. at 242 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote the court notes:
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York spent four
years investigating and prosecuting claims that officers assigned to the Wash-
ington Heights' anti-crime unit Local Motion for corruption and unjustified
arrests. During the investigation Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to
the case interviewed numerous individuals who aided in uncovering evidence
that members of the anti-crime unit committed perjury or made false state-
ments in connection with various arrests and the prosecution of both federal
and state crimes. Meanwhile, the 34th precinct leads the city in corruption
complaints filed against its officers.
Id. at 242 n.18 (citations omitted).
The judge was critical of not only the officers' claim that being in a high-crime
area suggests that one is engaging in illegal activity, but also of the police's characteri-
zation of a particular area as being crime-ridden in the first place. "Interestingly,"
writes Judge Baer, "the Government offered no proof to corroborate their statement
that the area surrounding 176th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue is a known hub for the
drug trade." Id. at 240 n.12.
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"[w]hat I find shattering is that in this day and age blacks in black
neighborhoods and blacks in white neighborhoods can count on little
security for their person. 42
Occurring during an election year, " [t]he decision.., quickly be-
came the focus of a nationwide controversy and a flashpoint for the
1996 presidential campaign, as Democrats and Republicans competed
to enhance their reputations as proponents of law and order by de-
nouncing Judge Baer. ''143 Baer ultimately vacated his own prior deci-
244sion. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the
admission of evidence, noting that:
[t]he strange behavior of the men who loaded the duffel bags into the
trunk of her car.., is itself an appropriate and weighty factor.... This
weighty factor makes the case before us easy.... [T]he men's odd behav-
ior while loading the car makes factors such as the high-crime neighbor-
hood and flight more significant.
24
5
The appellate court missed the point. It is not the significance of
the "strange" and "odd" behavior itself that is problematic. It is the
rationale underlying the characterization of the behavior as "odd" in
the first place that ignores the specifically racial context of the situa-
tion. When people of color act "oddly" around police officers in high-
crime areas, according to the appellate court, that makes a decision
such as this "easy," and suffices as a "weighty factor" that converts all
previously dubitable factors into "facts and circumstances ... suffi-
242 Id. at 240. The area in question, Washington Heights, is largely populated by
Latino and Black residents.
243 United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). Judge Baer himself
noted that "while I was surprised at the fire storm that developed.., to me the fallout
constituted little more than political posturing--some of what I saw I cannot say I am
proud of-but political posturing in an election year, nevertheless." Id. at 125 (altera-
tions in original) (citingJudge Baer's denial of a motion for recusal from the bench).
After the election was over, President Clinton acknowledged that "people of color con-
tinue to have less confidence and less trust [in the police], and believe that they are
targeted for actions by the police not because of their illegal conduct, but because of
the color of their skin." President Clinton, Remarks by the President on Civil Rights
Law Enforcement at the Opening of Civil Rights Roundtable at the Marriot Wardman
Park Hotel, Wash., D.C. (June 9, 1999), available at LEXIS.
244 The judge did so after hearing new evidence supplied by a sergeant whose tes-
timony was not included in the initial hearing. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp.
211, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
245 Bayless, 201 F.3d at 134 (emphasis added). The "strange" behavior referred to
was "[t]he speed with which the men loaded the bags into the trunk and dissociated
themselves from the car, together with the absence of any communication between the
driver and the men." Id.
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cient to give rise to reasonable suspicion."246 Just as courts ignore race
in context when they reduce a complex set of variables to a not impar-
tial definition of PTSD, similarly they ignore the role race may play
when they define behavior as "odd." The resulting choices with which
victims of color are left are hazardous: showing deference to the po-
lice, being nervous around them, and avoiding them will constitute
suspicious behavior-but questioning their authority, or even making
one's presence known to them, will likely lead to harassment.
Dismissal of pervasive racial stressors may have a more profound
effect than simply preventing plaintiffs of color from succeeding in
criminal trials or police misconduct cases. It reflects a disregard for
the autonomy of individuals of color.2 47 It interferes with the right of
people of color to participate in society.148 It engenders an under-
standing that things that disproportionately stress people of color-
such as police misconduct-are not as important, as legitimate, or as
objectively "real" as things that stress whites. It may reinforce stereo-
249types about antisocial or criminal behavior among people of color.
Dismissing the experiences of a marginalized people of color can even
be conceived as a "discursive strategy" that can "depoliticize talk and
keep [the problems of people of color] off'50 the agenda such that
"talk that is grounded in fragmented or marginalized discourses ... is
read as idiosyncratic or personal comment, having no political
force. 25 1
A statutory regime is therefore necessary to obligate judges to con-
246 Id.
247Jody Armour asserts that "[r]ace-based predictions of an individual's behavior
insufficiently recognize individual autonomy by reducing people to predictable objects
rather than treating them as autonomous entities." Armour, supra note 211, at 795.
Ignoring racial identity and the existence of racial stressors by assuming all people will
or should react uncritically according to the dictates of a white norm similarly disre-
gards the autonomy of people of color.
248 See id. ("[H]astier use of force against blacks forces blacks who do not want to
be mistaken for assailants to avoid ostensibly public places (such as 'white' neighbor-
hoods, automatic tellers, and even Manhattan boutiques) and core community activi-
ties (such as shopping, jogging, sightseeing, or just 'hanging out')."); id. (stating too
that this "hastier use of force" thus interferes with "the fullness of [African Americans']
public, participatory selves" (quoting PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTs 46 (1991) (alteration in original))).
249 See id. at 794 ("Ultimately, the courts' reliance on statistical generalizations may
provide an official imprimatur on stereotypes about the class in question....
[C]ountenancing race-based statistics might further entrench stereotypes about blacks
as criminals in the public's collective consciousness.").
250 Miller, supra note 199, at 159.
251 Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
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textualize the plaintiff-police interaction in light of the nexus between
the plaintiff's racial background and her experiences with the police.
The purpose of such a regime would not be to legitimize behavior
that is otherwise unreasonable (viewed as such because it is atypical
from the majority's perspective), but to establish that the plaintiffs
defensive reaction to the police was not unreasonable in the first
place, given the pervasive racism manifest in police protocol. When a
person of color is subject to police misconduct, a court's decision to
provide remedies must aim at redressing an injustice affecting the
recognized and respected rights of the victim. The court's rationale
should not be to forgive a plaintiff for behavior inappropriately con-
ceived of as being anomalous. Labeling the experiences that many
people of color have with police as abnormal (e.g., equivalent to a dis-
ability, or to any other concept used to legitimize behavior) under-
mines the validity of such experiences and normalizes abusive behav-
ior by police. It requires that plaintiffs of color portray themselves as
anomalous to secure the special procedural treatment needed to in-
crease the likelihood of successfully suing errant police. In short, one
must be "crazy" in order to sue the police and win.
C. Why Proposal Two Is Necessary: Revising the Statute to
Emphasize Societal Racism
There is a need to acknowledge racism's effect on the individual
psyche. Expanding the ADA's definitions of mental illness to include
racially discriminatory stressors may be worthwhile if it offers the
traumatized victim of color one more cause of action with which to
demand equal treatment-an ADA claim.
Proposal One, however, is an inadequate proposal standing alone.
It places the emphasis on the victim's psyche rather than on the na-
ture of the injustice, thus deflecting the determinative inquiry away
from whether there was a police-related injustice and toward a spuri-
ous focus on the legitimacy of the plaintiff's reaction. Furthermore,
acknowledging the effect of race on the individual is problematic if
not accompanied by an acknowledgement of racism's effect on society
as a whole. This leads to people confusing the traumatized individual
of color with the healthy person of color responding to societal ra-
cism. A serious approach to police misconduct must first and fore-
most recognize that racism exists and routinely affects people of color,
even when its victims do not respond to it by developing mental ill-
nesses. The legal system must recognize that the reactions of people
of color to police misconduct are often reasonable responses to socie-
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tal racism and not anomalous manifestations of a damaged psyche. As
such, a race-conscious means of addressing societal racism and its
manifestations in police conduct is necessary to protect not only the
rights of people of color with stress disorders, but also to protect those
who, even though they have not developed diagnosed stress disorders,
still suffer from the same racist externalities. Proposal Two accom-
plishes this goal.
1. A Blueprint for Making the Advantages of the ADA Available
so as to Benefit Plaintiffs of Color
Proposal Two distills the useful procedural properties of the ADA
and makes their advantages accessible to victims of color. By omitting
the disability rhetoric while retaining the procedural benefits that
overcome the problems arising out of the application of § 1983, it be-
comes possible to fuse the best of both statutes. A § 1983/ADA hybrid
would offer the procedural advantages of the ADA to the intended
beneficiaries of traditional § 1983 police misconduct suits. The ADA's
procedural advantages252 need not be limited to the context of ADA
claims alone.
A new police misconduct statute should therefore set forth the fol-
lowing advantages, discussed above in the context of the ADA , or
some combination thereof: (1) safeguards preventing government
entities from escaping liability through qualified immunity and inter-
locutory appeal; (2) respondeat superior liability for officers' actions
instead of the current Monell liability; (3) requirements for self-
evaluation and modification internal to the police misconduct statute
itself; (4) an assignment of affirmative duties to police to ensure that
persons apprehended are cared for properly when taken into custody;
(5) assignment of affirmative duties to both public and private correc-
tional institution officers to avoid violating prisoners' rights under the
proposed statute; and (6) stipulations permitting successful plaintiffs
to receive broad recovery of litigation expenses.
In addition, the statute should effectuate a race-conscious ap-
proach by including: (7) a judicial obligation to take the race of the
plaintiff into account when considering interactions with the police.
Speaking with respect to African Americans in particular, Professor
Butler suggests that it is entirely appropriate, if not necessary, that
they cite as evidence "their own experiences and other people's sto-
252 Supra Part I.B.
253 Id.
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ries, African-American history, understanding gained from social sci-
ence research on the power and pervasiveness of white supremacy,
and ugly statistics"254 when analyzing the American system ofjustice.2 55
The more informed and comprehensive a judge's examination of the
racial context surrounding a particular interaction-that is, as the
judge expands her inquiry to consider the types of evidence Professor
Butler mentions-the more likely it is that evidence will emerge to in-
dicate that the particular plaintiff of color has been exposed to some
experience that would reasonably engender a distrust of the police
system in this country.
Because judges are often unprepared or unwilling to expand their
inquiry to such a degree, they are unlikely to consider the "reasonable
man" to be influenced by such evidence. 25' Furthermore, the reason-
able person test is prone to misapplication: a judge who refuses to
consider the evidence suggested by Professor Butler is unlikely to re-
frain from simply condemning the response of a plaintiff of color to
police misconduct as a "character flaw"257 that was not overcome. Ac-
254 Butler, supra note 209, at 691.
255i The Supreme Court will sometimes allow a plaintiff to offer statistical and cir-
cumstantial evidence to create a rebuttable, prima facie case that race is a motivating
factor of a government action. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (holding
that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selec-
tion of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of per-
emptory challenges at the defendant's trial by showing membership in a cognizable
racial group, that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race, and that the facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor excluded veniremen from the
petit jury on account of their race). Even the Batson opinion, however, would not nec-
essarily obligate a judge to consider the type of evidence Butler mentions, such as the
plaintiff's experiences of societal racism and white supremacy, or prior experiences of
the same among police officers.
256 David Cole discusses the problems of relying on judicial conceptions of a "rea-
sonable person." COLE, supra note 6, at 16-27. In United States v. Mendenhall 446 U.S.
544, 555 (1980), a traveler stopped by police in an airport and asked to show his iden-
tification was not "seized" by the encounter because the Court decided that a "reason-
able person" would feel free to walk away. With that standard in mind, Cole considers
Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989), in which a young black man sleeping
on the back of a cross-country bus was awakened and asked whether two sheriff's offi-
cers could search his bag. Bostick consented, and the officers claim to have found co-
caine in his bag. Cole notes that "[f]ew of us, awakened in the middle of a marathon
bus ride by armed police officers standing over us, asking for our identification and
requesting to search our bags, would feel free to tell the officers to mind their own
business." He surmises, "the Supreme Court's 'reasonable person' apparently has a lot
more mettle than the average Joe." COLE, supra note 6, at 18. "[T]his standard will
have very different effects.., on minority and white citizens." Id. at 20.
257 See Armour, supra note 211, at 789 ("[T]he actual moral norm implicit in the
reasonable man test is that blame is reserved for persons who fail to overcome charac-
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cordingly, it is necessary to secure through statutory protection the
plaintiffs ability to draw on such evidence while still being considered
a "reasonable man [or woman] ."
2. A Race-Conscious Statute Is Necessary Because the
Current Statutory Interpretations Provide a
Mistaken Impression of Racial Equality
The Supreme Court has determined that race is a suspect class
such that allegedly racially discriminatory laws require strict equal pro-
258tection scrutiny, while, for instance, laws affecting people with men-
tal disabilities do not even merit mid-tier equal protection scrutiny.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's heightened vigilance against racial
discrimination has resulted in a statutory regime that facilitates reme-
dies for people with disabilities more than it does for people of color
with respect to police misconduct.260 This overlooks the very groups of
people who are among those most likely to need statutory protec-
tion-people of color.26'
ter flaws that they can fairly be expected to surmount for the sake of important social
interests." (citing George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1291 (1974))).
258 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be
noted.., that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding
that the underlying law was constitutional but the actions of those in power in applying
the law were discriminatory toward Chinese Americans and thus unconstitutional).
Korematsu is ironic given that it actually disadvantaged Japanese Americans. Indeed,
even when measures are taken to remedy discrimination against racial groups subject
to oppression, strict scrutiny still applies. For instance, the Supreme Court held in City
of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), that absent proof of specific in-
stances of discrimination, laws attempting to effect an outright racial balancing will be
struck down:
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool.... [T] he standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefit-
ted by a particular classification.
Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted). But see Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 485 (1982) (noting that "every attempt to address a racial issue [will not nec-
essarily give] rise to an impermissible racial classification").
See City of Cleburue v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985)
(declining to use heightened scrutiny on the grounds that the mentally disabled are
not considered a protected class).
260 See supra Part II (describing the advantages the ADA has for people with dis-
abilities that § 1983 does not offer to plaintiffs of color subject to police misconduct).
261 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (documenting the fact that people of
color are disproportionately subject to police misconduct).
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A new statute is necessary not only to hold the judiciary true to the
legislature's professed intentions to effect equal protection, but also to
avoid frustrating the legal and political claims of plaintiffs of color,
recognizing that "'democracy,' as practiced in the United States, has
betrayed African-Americans [and arguably other people of color as
well] far more than they could ever betray it."262 Professor Butler ar-
ticulates a view characteristic of Critical Race Theory, pointing out
that "black jurors symbolize the fairness and impartiality of the law"
even if those black jurors endorse racial critiques of American crimi-
nal justice.23 Butler refers to this role of black jurors as the "legitimi-
zation function." 4 He notes that "[b]ecause the United States is both
a democracy and a pluralist society, it is important that diverse groups
appear to have a voice in the laws that govern them.' 5 When an ap-
pearance of a voice is coupled with impotence in practice, however,
that appearance is often used to instill complacency in the face of an
inequitable distribution ofjustice and tojustify inaction in support of
the inequitable status quo. In such a situation, "[i] t would be farcical
for [a blackjuror] to be the sole color-blind actor in the criminal pro-
cess, especially when it is her blackness that advertises the system's
fairness ."6
The above discussion of the lack of effective statutory protection
of plaintiffs of color in police misconduct cases and the simultaneous
nominal protections against racial discrimination understood to be
embodied by § 1983 suggest a situation analogous to Butler's discus-
sion of the role of blackjurors who are critical of the American system
of jurisprudence. Butler's reasoning is accordingly poignant if ex-
tended to address police misconduct. He writes:
What does "viable democracy" assume about the power of an unpopular
minority group to make the laws that affect them? It assumes that the
group has the power to influence legislation. The American majority-
rule electoral system is premised on the hope that the majority will not
tyrannize the minority, but rather represent the minority's interests. In-
deed, in creating the Constitution, the Framers attempted to guard
262 Butler, supra note 209, at 706; see also GRIER & COBBS, supra note 21, at 144
("All Americans feel committed to the principle of 'all men, created equal,' but it does
not occupy a central position in their view of their place in America. It is a case of 'All
men are born equal, but white men are more equal than anyone else."').
263 Butler, supra note 209, at 712.
24 Id. The use of the term "legitimize" in Part IV.B supra and elsewhere in this
Comment is not related to Butler's use of the term here.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 714.
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against the oppression of the minority by the majority. Unfortunately,
these attempts were expressed more in theory than in actual constitu-
tional guarantees ....
Resistance by minorities to the operation of majority rule may
take several forms, including "overt compliance and secret rejection of
the legitimacy of the political 
order.
Arguably, "odd" reactions to the police may constitute just such resis-
tance, and may even represent involuntary or reflexive rejection of the
notion that police promote the well-being of all citizens equally.
Efforts to acknowledge and respond to the circumstances prompt-
ing such resistance by promoting remedies for people of color specifi-
cally are met with criticisms that people of color are already protected,
have the same opportunities available to them that whites have, and
thus deserve no special accommodation.28  At the same time, the
nominal protections afforded by § 1983 threaten to render it a mere
legitimizing tool with respect to police misconduct. A new police mis-
conduct statute obligating judges to take the race of the plaintiff into
account when considering an interaction between the plaintiff and
the police is necessary to avoid that end.
3. A Race-Conscious Statute Would Better Ensure That
the Anti-Discrimination Overtures of the Legislature
Are More Than Nominal
A Supreme Court majority has interpreted the legacy of the Civil
Rights movement as a denunciation of race-conscious applications of
the law.2 6" As discussed above, however, several judges and justices
have taken race into consideration, recognizing that adverse reactions
to the police based on race are not necessarily abnormal.2 7 0 But de-
spite the legislature's nominal willingness to protect the civil rights of
267 Id. at 710-11.
268 William Grier and Price Cobbs further note:
Americans are characteristically unwilling to think about the past.... [T]hese
attitudes.., bring white Americans to an impasse when they claim to "under-
stand" black people. After all, the thoughts begin, the Negro is also an
American and if he is different it is only a matter of degree. Cliches are
brought forth and there is a lengthy recitation of the names of famous Ne-
groes.
GRIER & COBBS, supra note 21, at 23.
269 See supra note 258 (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Richmond
v.JA. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
270 See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text (providing examples).
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people of color, the hands of judges have been tied. Judges who
engage in race-conscious critiques of police, by recognizing that peo-
ple of color are disproportionately subject to the "corrupt, abusive
and violent" spate of police misconduct, are denounced as judicial ac-
272tivists amidst a volley of misdirected political aspirations. This sug
gests that judges could administer justice more efficiently and clearly
if they had a statutory reference point to support them.
A new statute is therefore necessary to reconcile legislative intent
with practical effect. A statute effectively curbing police misconduct
directed at people of color, however, must be race conscious. Other-
wise, further legislation is unlikely to have any effect. Malcolm X re-
peatedly noted, even in the 1960s, that there were plenty of laws in
place that could be interpreted to assert the rights of people of color
if those in power had any intention to do so. 275 Judges are already ob-
ligated to look at how a reasonable person would respond to the par-
ticular facts and context of the case at hand, but the results remain bi-
271 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the text of the § 1983 civil
rights statute).
272 United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2000) (recounting that,
in reaction to judge Baer's ruling in the case, in which he acknowledged the commu-
nity's perception of the police as "corrupt, abusive and violent," (quoting United States
v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)), "more than two hundred members of
Congress, led by Republican Representatives Bill McCollum, Fred Upton, and Michael
Forbes, sent a letter to President Clinton calling Judge Baer's ruling 'a shocking and
egregious example ofjudicial activism."' (citingJon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Contro-
versy, 80JUDICATURE 156, 156 (1997))); see also supra notes 24344 and accompanying
text (discussing the impact the upcoming Presidential election had on the judge's
opinion).
273 Malcolm X commended the outlook of the black person who "doesn't see any
progress that he has made since the Civil War... because ... if the Civil War had freed
him, he wouldn't need civil-rights legislation today." He continued, "[i]f the Emanci-
pation Proclamation . . . had freed him, he wouldn't be singing 'We Shall Overcome'
today. If the amendments to the Constitution had solved his problem, his problem
wouldn't still be here today." Malcolm X, The Black Revolution, Speech at the Militant
Labor Forum at Palm Gardens in N.Y.C. (Apr. 8, 1964), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS:
SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 45, 52-53 (George Breitman ed., 1990).
Such criticisms are equally apropos today, if not more so. Consider the following
criticism, written over thirty years ago, which still resonates in current times:
In spite of the profound shifts in power throughout the world in the past
thirty years, the United States seems to have a domestic objective of "business
as usual," with no change needed or in fact wanted. All the nasty problems
are overseas. At home the search is for bigger profits and smaller costs, better
education and lower taxes .... Problems at home are to be talked away, rea-
soned into nonexistence, and put to one side ....
GRIER & COBBS, supra note 21, at 203.
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ased against people of color.27 4 Judges already have statutes available
to them to punish police, but they choose not to-judges allow po-
lice misconduct to continue.
In order to avoid the impotence of previous civil rights laws, an
explicitly race-conscious rule is necessary to hold judges accountable
in no uncertain terms for refusing to acknowledge that race plays a
role in police encounters. A serious commitment to ensuring that the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs of color are honored in fact (not just
in theory) requires a statute mandating that judges contextualize
plaintiffs' claims by looking explicitly at the effects that the plaintiffs'
race may have on interactions with, and treatment by, the police. In
other words, securing adequate protection for people of color with re-
spect to police misconduct requires a statute designed not as a call for
greater judicial independence, but rather for judicial accountability. 77
4. Statutory Revision Would Benefit Officers as Well
A new police misconduct statute, as outlined above, would also of-
fer advantages to the police officers themselves. First, it would boost
police morale by facilitating increased community appreciation of po-
lice presence. If municipalities or states incur liability for the actions
of their employee officers, it will be in the best interest of police de-
partments to emphasize that officers are personally accountable for
their conduct. Even if the officers are not named as defendants, po-
lice departments will be more inclined to impose internal means of
discouraging misconduct if the departments themselves are held li-
able. In turn, officers will be discouraged from protecting errant col-
274 See supra note 256 (describing the court's application of a reasonable person
standard to the detriment of people of color).
27 There are many causes of action codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985, and
1986, which initially promised great leaps toward true equal protection, and which
could be interpreted without straying very far from their literal meaning to hold police
more accountable for their actions. Rather, the practical efficacy of democratically
voiced mandates of equal protection is retarded largely by caselaw.
276"By failing to consider the citizen's prior experiences with the police in deter-
mining whether a 'seizure' has occurred," for example, "the Court permits the police
to employ, on average, more coercion against black persons than against whites," such
that "the same police conduct will be more threatening when directed against a black
man than when directed against a white man." COLE, supra note 6, at 26-27.
277 As it stands, judges have leeway to engage in bias unchecked. See, e.g., Spann,
supra note 192, at 4 (arguing that "the issue of how societal resources should be allo-
cated between the majority and racial minorities is an issue ... [in which] Supreme
Court involvement... provides an artificial boost to the interests of the white majority"
(citation omitted)).
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leagues if they know that they are more likely to be held accountable
for "covering up" misconduct, and, alternatively, that they are com-
mended for stepping forward to expose such misconduct. The "Blue
Wall of Silence," a serious impediment tojust law enforcement,2 8 will
thereby begin to crumble.2 7' This will benefit the policed community
by encouraging a more honest and transparent police force, and by
facilitating familiarity and trust among officers and the individuals
they are intended to protect and serve. In return, officers who have
reason to believe that the community in which they work appreciates
and respects their presence, rather than views them suspiciously, will
experience an increase in morale.
Second, officers stand to benefit more directly from an erosion of
the "Blue Wall of Silence." Many officers are uncomfortable and un-
willing to perpetuate informal codes of silence. 2 0 Discouraging codes
of silence would alleviate the worry among officers that they may of-
fend colleagues and endanger themselves by not being complicit in
misconduct.28 ' A statutory mechanism honored by the courts and the
precincts to address misconduct would prevent the burden of expos-
ing unsafe or illegal police activity from falling on the shoulders of
honest officers alone. Furthermore, officers of color are themselves
278 See BURRIs, supra note 8, at 178 ("The single most tenacious obstacle to reform
in police departments across the nation is what is known as the 'blue wall,' or the 'code
of silence.').
279 The "Blue Wall of Silence" is so entrenched in police culture that an officer
recently filed suit claiming that it was his constitutional right to have other officers
cover up his misconduct. When other officers did not cover up for him, plaintiff sued
based on selective enforcement, claiming injuries of ostracism, alienation of friend-
ships, and the withholding of preferential treatment by fellow police. Diesel v. Lewis-
boro, 232 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
280 See BURRIs, supra note 8, at 38 ("I've talked to many police officers who felt
sickened by what they had seen a brutal cop do, but the price for speaking out was
simply too high."); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999,
(Magazine), at 50, 85 (claiming that police, including black officers, will admit in pri-
vate that racial "tunnel vision" is a hazard of the job). One officer's experiences with a
code of silence were considered sufficiently dramatic to be memorialized in the film
SERPICO (Paramount Pictures 1973) (based on the 1973 book by Peter Maas), in which
Al Pacino plays the role of Officer Frank Serpico, who ultimately resigned from the
New York Police Department after testifying about police corruption among his col-
leagues before the Knapp Commission. Because of his whistleblowing, his fellow offi-
cers did not back him up in a raid, and he was shot as a result. He resigned in 1972
after twelve years of service.
281 See Leonard Sykes, Jr. & James H. Burnett, III, The Long Arm of Racial Profiling,
MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Mar. 24, 2001, at 1B ("While most officers surveyed argued
that profiling as a practice is inherently wrong, many expressed concern that their re-
sponses [to a University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee survey about racial profiling] could be
misconstrued as being disloyal and anti-police.").
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also subject to misconduct, and have voiced their opposition to its
perpetuation.2
Third, officers and the community benefit from admonishing er-
rant officers since police misconduct is often perpetrated by repeat
offenders. Identifying problematic officer conduct after an initial
offense and removing governmental immunities would: (1) prevent
further incidents of brutality by that officer and thereby help reduce
the stigma cast on the officer's innocent colleagues; (2) allow the of-
fending officer to receive treatment and better training; (3) save local
taxpayers from bearing the costs of redundant lawsuits on behalf of
the municipality; 84 and (4) avoid subjecting citizens to substandard
police protection at the hands of disgruntled officers with a grudge
282 See David Kocieniewski, Bias Permeates the State Police, Whitman Admits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1999, at Al (discussing an officer who complained of hostile treatment at
the workplace in the form of "racial discrimination and sexual harassment"); Officers
Take on Department over Race Issues: Investigation of San Jose Detective's Comment About Stop-
ping Blacks Nears Completion, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 5, 2000, at IA ("Energized
by the national campaign to condemn racial profiling . . . some [black officers] have
crossed the thin blue line to make their battle public."); Nina Shapiro, Black and Blue:
Affican-American Law Enforcement Officials Feel Caught Between Two Worlds, SEATTLE
WKLY., June 21, 2001, at 13 ("African Americans have predominated at the ongoing
protests and forums over the fatal police shooting of Aaron Roberts."); Sykes & Bur-
nett, supra note 281, at lB (according to one officer of color discussing how he is
treated by white officers, "[w] hat happens.., is that when you're in your street clothes
you no longer have your blue uniform on[; b]ut what you do have on is your black-
ness-the fact that you're African-American"). The Kocieniewski article also relates
such incidents as
female troopers who said their co mmander had referred to them using vulgar
descriptions of female genitalia, black officers who said they had been fre-
quently demeaned by racial slurs, and a Hispanic officer who said he had been
verbally harassed and abandoned on a roadway after having been stripped
down to his underwear by fellow troopers.
Kocieniewski, supra. And the Shapiro article additionally notes:
Carlos Bratcher, president of the black officers' association and a detective in
the King County sheriffs office, says it's important for people to realize that
the 'minority community isn't just crying wolf' regarding police racism, par-
ticularly when it comes to racial profiling .... [He] believes he was himself
needlessly stopped ... when he was more informally dressed and driving off-
duty.
Shapiro, supra.
283 See, e.g., BURRIS supra note 8, at 72 ("In Oakland, I have repeatedly encoun-
tered the same cops in civil cases involving brutality; there was one officer who was the
subject of 37 investigations before he eventually left the force."); INDEP. COMM'N ON
THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT, at iii (1991) ("There is a significant number of offi-
cers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force against the public and persis-
tentld ignore the written guidelines of the Department regarding force.").
84 "A recent report stated that [New York] City has paid $176.9 million to dispose
of more than 3,500 police misconduct lawsuits since 1994." GREEN, supra note 29, at 2.
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against the communities they patrol. It should be emphasized that
removing immunity does not place innocent officers at a disadvan-
tage-they, like all other citizens, are innocent until proven guilty,
and the courts and juries will afford them no less impartiality than
they afford all other defendants.
Finally, the explicitly race-conscious aspect of the proposed statute
would not be unduly difficult for officers to heed. While many people
are of indeterminate racial background upon first glance (and ac-
knowledging the argument that race is socially constructed anyway),
officers identify people as nonwhite all the time. Indeed, if officers
could not make racial determinations, there would be no racial dis-
crimination in the first place-it is apparent that officers make racial
determinations because they single out people of color for miscon-
duct. Furthermore, the ADA already obliges officers to treat PTSD
sufferers with care, and determining that someone is nonwhite is gen-
erally easier than determining whether or not someone has PTSD
upon first glance.285
V. ANTICIPATING AND ADDRESSING SOME POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF
ENACTING NEW POLICE MISCONDUCT LEGISLATION
A. Responding to the Fear That a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute
Would Encourage Justifying Racist Crimes by Whites
Critics may argue that by allowing the judge to consider race in
context, such a statute would implicitly support using race to justify
otherwise inordinate aggression toward people of color by white civil-
ians or by white police officers. The response to that criticism is un-
fortunate, but not novel: whites already successfully use race to justify
to the court inordinate, and often violent, behavior toward people of
color.286  "Indeed," writes Jody D. Armour, "it has been well-
285 While it would be impractical to require every officer to obtain a functional
proficiency in identifying PTSD comparable to that obtained by acquiring a degree in
psychology, determining race is feasible. Officers often must make snap judgments
about a suspect's psychological profile, despite the fact that officers historically are
wary of psychological evaluation. See Talbott & Talbott, supra note 187, at 898-99 (not-
ing that officers have been reticent about accepting the consultation services of psy-
chiatrists, especially when those services are applied in order to evaluate the police
themselves). Similarly, even officers who are critical of having to pay explicit attention
to race may nonetheless be expected to do so.
286 An analogous argument has been used by Professor Butler in responding to the
claim that supporting jury nullification by black jurors as a means of resisting a crimi-
nal justice system of which those jurors are critical will lead to whites nullifying in cases
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documented that defendants in self-defense cases exploit the racial
prejudices of jurors in asserting the reasonableness of their fear of
supposed assailants who are black."
28 7
of white-on-black crime. Butler's response is that "white people do nullify in those
cases." Butler, supra note 209, at 722.
287 Armour, supra note 211, at 783. Armour offers a hypothetical example: if a
woman at an automatic teller machine late at night sees a black man approaching and
shoots him in a fit of panic, thinking he is a criminal based on a previous traumatic
experience in which she had been assaulted by a black man, "she might claim that her
overreaction to the victim's race was reasonable in light of her earlier traumatic expe-
rience." Id. at 782; see also, e.g., People v. Goetz, 520 N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (1987) (sentenc-
ing Bernhard Goetz to a split sentence of only six months after shooting a group of
black boys on a subway, and discussing his desire to defend himself in a "high-crime
area"). While a list of anecdotes would be unduly burdensome and beyond the scope
of this Comment, Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee offers a powerful selection of cases that indi-
cate how stereotypes and racist justifications have been applied to exculpate violent
crimes by whites against people of color. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-
Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 369
(1996) (examining "the topic of race and self-defense through the lens of socially con-
structed stereotypes about Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos" (footnotes omitted)).
Lee discusses the case of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American who was beaten to death
with a baseball bat by a white father-son pair to such an extent that pieces of brain mat-
ter were splattered on the pavement. Chin's race was at issue in the attack, his assail-
ants calling him a "nip" and telling him that "it's because of you little mother fuckers
that we're out of work." The judge sentenced the defendants to three years of proba-
tion and a $3780 fine, saying "'Had it been a brutal murder, those fellows would be in jail
now."' Id. at 431-32 (quoting Dana Sachs, The Murderer Next Door, MOTHER JONES,
July/Aug. 1989, at 54 (emphasis added by Lee)).
In 1992, a Louisiana homeowner shot and killed Yoshihiro Hattori, a sixteen-year-
oldJapanese foreign exchange student. Hattori, accompanied by his white friend, and
dressed in a tuxedo as a character from the movie SATURDAY NIGHT FEVER (Paramount
Pictures 1977), mistakenly rang the defendant homeowner's doorbell while looking for
a nearby Halloween party. Without asking any questions, the homeowner emerged
from the house with a laser-scoped .44 magnum and within three seconds shot and
killed Hattori. The homeowner's acquittal from a charge of manslaughter-not mur-
der-was received by the applause of courtroom spectators after less than three hours
of deliberation. The homeowner's attorney played on racist characterizations of the
Japanese "enemy," telling the jury, for example, that Hattori was acting menacingly,
"like a stranger invading someone's home turf." Lee, supra, at 432-37 (quoting Defense
Depicts Japanese Boy as 'Scary, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at A10). The homeowner's
wife, who first alerted her husband to Hattori's presence, said "I guess he appeared
Oriental. He could have been Mexican or whatever." Id. at 437 (quoting Testimony of
Bonnie Peairs at 22, State v. Peairs (May 22, 1993) (on file with Lee)). Lee points out
that "[a]ll [Bonnie Peairs] knew was that Hattori looked different,'foreign," id. at 438,
and that if Hattori's white companion had been shot instead, "the defense would have
had a more difficult time portraying the victim as 'a crazy man,' 'frightening,' or
'scary,' terms used to describe Hattori," id.
Lee also describes the case of Cesar Ren6 Arce and David Hillo, two young Mexi-
can Americans shot by a passing white pedestrian civilian carrying a loaded, unlicensed
gun who found them spray painting a freeway column. Id. at 445. The gunman claims
he thought the boys were behind him and that he turned and fired in self-defense. Id.
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In short, unless the present state of the law is adjusted, assaults on
people of color will remain successfully justified by racial stereotypes
in the courts, while the nonviolent reactions of people of color to po-
lice officers will remain unjustifiable by virtue of a legacy of racist po-
lice.
B. Responding to the Colorblind Critique on Its Own Terms:
Debunking the Contention That Contextualizing
Race in Police Interactions Is Itself Racist
Those embracing a colorblind approach to law, politically conser-
vative critics, and critics disputing the relevance or reliability of the
anecdotal evidence offered above, predictably will argue that requir-
ing a judge to consider the impact of the plaintiff's race on her reac-
tion to the police (or on the police's treatment of the plaintiff) makes
it alright for a plaintiff to defy the police by "playing the race card."
That is, these critics will argue that a new police misconduct statute
like that described above would unfairly offer people of color special
treatment because of their race alone.
Such criticisms, however, would not apply to the proposed police
misconduct statute, even if one were to concede the validity of a col-
orblind stance, because there is a distinction between engaging in rac-
ist beliefs about others and responding to the racist beliefs of others.
The proposed police misconduct statute would facilitate protecting
plaintiffs' responses to racism; it would not protect engaging in racist
behavior. A new police statute would not require that a plaintiff of
color's reaction be excused because of the plaintiff's fear of the race
of the officer. Rather, the plaintiff's reaction would be a response to
officers' race-based apprehensiveness of the plaintiff, regardless of the
officer's race. (Officers of color, after all, are often guilty of engaging
at 446. The boys were shot in the back and buttocks (killing Arce), and could not have
been approaching the gunman. Id. Lee notes that while the Los Angeles District At-
torney's Office declined to prosecute the gunman, the same District Attorney's Office
"filed murder and manslaughter charges against two Black men ... who claimed they
shot another Black man in self-defense, disbelieving their self-defense claim largely be-
cause the victim was shot in the back and buttocks." Id. at 446-47. The gunman was
hailed as a local hero by a neighboring councilwoman. Id. at 448. Lee contrasts Arce's
death with the public outrage at the four-month prison sentence, fine, and caning of
Michael Fay, a white American teenager caught vandalizing in Singapore. "If a Singa-
porean citizen had shot and killed Fay after catching him in the act of spray-painting
the Singaporean citizen's car, it is unlikely that Americans would view the Singaporean
as a hero .... " Id. at 450-51.
PROTECTION FROM PROTECTION
218in racist police misconduct also. Plaintiffs of color are therefore of-
ten wary of officers regardless of their race.) A new police statute
would allow the judge to admit as reasonable the plaintiffs reaction to,
not her submission to, race-based fears.
The critic may respond that for a plaintiff to assume that another
individual harbors race-based fears itself constitutes a racist belief and
exhibits a race-based fear. Even if this were true, that argument would
apply only to the act of anticipating that another individual is racist
because she is of a particular race. It would not apply to a plaintiff an-
ticipating that another individual is racist because of her occupation
as a police officer.
It is therefore not inconsistent to argue in support of a new statute
that permits judges to consider the race of the plaintiff in context,
while criticizing decisions that permit white defendants who assault
people of color to justify their actions based on race-based fears. A
new police statute would obligate the judge simply to consider that
adverse reactions to racism are reasonable. It would not permit or en-
courage judges to claim that racist beliefs justify otherwise unreason-
able behavior toward other persons.
CONCLUSION
Police misconduct is a serious problem in the United States, ad-
versely affecting people of color in particular. Although there appears
to be a legislative desire to provide a remedy for such discriminatory
behavior, evidenced by the enactment of § 1983, traditional criminal
and civil remedies for police misconduct have proven inadequate,
leaving counsel for plaintiffs in search of more creative, more effective
methods of representing clients victimized by police. As a result, the
ADA has been suggested as an alternative in police misconduct litiga-
tion. Taken separately, however, and subject to the prevailing color-
blind judicial interpretation, neither § 1983 nor the ADA offers an
adequate litigation tool for causes of action by people of color who are
victims of police misconduct.
This Comment has considered how the implications of a compari-
son between § 1983 and the ADA testify to the need for a race-
conscious means of facilitating the claims of people of color who file
288 See, e.g., Michael P. Tremoglie, Cops in the 'Hood, FRONTPAGE MAG. (Feb. 15,
2001), at http://www.frontpagemag.com/columnists/tremoglie/2001/tremO2-15-
01.htm ("Minority police officers are often tougher on their own people than white
cops.").
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suit for police misconduct. By combining the procedural benefits of
the ADA with the civil rights rationale underlying § 1983 in a race-
conscious manner, it may be possible to close the statutory gap that
currently deprives many people of color of an effective means of pur-
suing police misconduct litigation.
